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THE  KING  CHATTING  WITH  ADMIRAL  BEATTY 


THE  ACHIEVEMENT  OF  THE 

BRITISH  NAVY  IN  THE 

WORLD-WAR 


BY 

JOHN  LEYLAND 


■%ll^v 


ILLUSTRATED 


NEW  YORK 
GEORGE  H.  DORAN  COMPANY 

^  1       .. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I.   Duties  and  Responsibilities  of  the 

Sea  Service i 

II.   The  Centre  of  Sea-Power    ....  ii 

III.  Sweeping  the  Enemy  from  the  Oceans  21 

IV.  The   Grasp   of   the   Mediterranean: 

Sea- and  Land-Power 29 

V.   Dealing  with  the  Submarines    ...  37 

VI.   The  Navy  and  the  Mine 46 

VII.   The  Navy  and  Army  Transport      .     .  55 

VIII.   The  Navy  that  Flies 64 

IX.   Officers  and  Men  of  the  Navy      .     .  71 

X.   What  the  British  Navy  is  and  What 

IT  Fights  for 79 


[V 


ILLUSTRATIONS 

The  King  Chatting  with  Admiral  Beatty 

Frontispiece 

PAGE 

A  British  Fleet  Steaming  in  Line  Ahead  .     .  6 

Drifters  Working  at  Sea 6 

A  Drifter  at  Sea:  Looking  for  Submarines 

AND  Mines 22 

A  Drifter  Laying  Anti-Submarine  Nets  ,     .  22 

Fleets   in   Alliance:    British   and   Itallan 

Ships  in  the  Adriatic 38 

On  Board  the  Queen  Elizabeth  at  Mudros  .     .  38 

A  Fleet  Manoeuvring  at  Sea 64 

The    Captured    German    Submarine    Mine- 
Layer  UC5 64 

A  British  Submarine 80 

Journalists  on  Board  a  Monitor    ....  80 


MAPS: 

I.— The   Centre   of   Sea-Power:  The 
North  Sea 

11. — ^The  Grasp  of  the  Mediterranean: 
Sea-  and  Land-Power 


At  end 
'  of  book 


va 


THE  ACHIEVEMENT  OF  THE  BRITISH 
NAVY  IN  THE  WORLD-WAR 


CHAPTER  I 
Duties  and  RESPONSiBiLixrES  of  the  Sea  Service 

Had  I  the  fabled  herb 
That  brought  to  life  the  dead, 

Whom  would  I  dare  disturb 
In  his  eternal  bed? 

Great    Grenville    would    I    wake, 

And  with  glad  tidings   make 

The  soul  of  mighty  Drake 
Lift  an  exulting  head. 

William  Watson. 

WHEN  King  George  returned  from  the  visit 
he  paid  to  the  Grand  Fleet  in  June,  19 17, 
he  sent  a  message  to  Admiral  Sir  David 
Beatty,  who  had  succeeded  Sir  John  Jellicoe  in  the 
command,  in  which  he  said  that  "never  had  the 
British  Navy  stood  higher  in  the  estimation  of  friend 
or  foe."  His  Majesty  spoke  of  people  who  reason 
and  understand.  But  it  is  certainly  true  that  the 
work  of  the  Sea  Service  during  this  unparalleled  war 
has  never  been  properly  appreciated  by  many  of 
those  who  have  benefited  by  it  most.  The  silent 
Navy  does  its  work  unobserved.  The  record  of  its 
heroism  and  the  services  it  renders  pass  unobserved 
by  the  multitude.  Sometimes  it  emerges  to  strike  a 
blow,  engage  in  a  ''scrap,"  or,  it  may  be,  to  fight 
a  battle,  and  then  it  retires  into  obscurity  again.  Its 
achievements  are  forgotten.  Only  the  bombardment 
of  a  coast  town  or  the  torpedoing  of  a  big  ship,  which 

I 


2     The  Achievement  of  the  British  Navy 

the  Navy  did  not  frustrate,  is  remembered.  Such  has 
been  the  case  in  all  the  naval  campaigns  of  the  past. 
Englishmen,  who  depend  upon  the  Navy  for  their 
security  and  the  means  of  their  life  and  livelihood, 
as  well  as  for  their  power  of  action  against  their 
enemies,  are  but  half  conscious  of  what  the  Fleet  is 
doing  for  them.  On  this  matter,  British  statesmen, 
when  they  speak  about  the  war,  almost  invariably 
fail  to  enlighten  them. 

Who  can  wonder  that  people  in  the  Allied  countries 
are  still  less  able  to  realise  that  behind  all  the  fighting 
of  their  own  armies  lies  the  influence  of  sea-power, 
exercised  by  the  British  Fleet  and  the  fleets  that 
came  one  after  another  into  co-operation  with  it? 
Without  this  power  of  the  sea  there  could  have  been 
no  hope  of  success  in  the  war.  As  the  King  said, 
the  Navy  defends  British  shores  and  commerce,  and 
secures  for  England  and  her  Allies  the  ocean  highways 
of  the  world.  The  purpose  of  this  book  is  to  show 
how  these  things  are  done. 

On  the  first  day  of  hostilities  the  British  Navy 
laid  hold  upon  the  road  that  would  lead  to  victory. 
There  is  no  hyperbole  in  saying  that  the  Grand 
Fleet,  in  its  northern  anchorages,  from  the  very 
beginning,  influenced  the  military  situation  through- 
out the  world,  and  made  possible  many  of  the  opera- 
tions of  the  armies,  which  could  neither  have  been 
successfully  initiated  nor  continued  without  it.  But 
in  the  early  days  of  August,  19 14,  when,  from  the 
war  cloud  which  had  overshadowed  Europe,  broke 
forth  the  lurid  horrors  of  the  conflict,  the  situation 
was   extremely   critical.    What   was  required   to  be 


Responsibilities  of  the  Sea  Service     3 

done  had  to  be  done  quickly  and  unhesitatingly,  lest 
the  enemy  should  strike  an  unforeseen  blow.  Happily, 
with  faultless  knowledge,  the  strategy  of  the  emer- 
gency was  realised,  and  with  unerring  instinct  and 
sagacity  it  was  applied.  The  foresight  of  great  naval 
administrators,  and  chiefly  of  Lord  Fisher,  who  had 
brought  about  the  regeneration  of  the  British  Navy, 
shaping  it  for  modern  conditions,  was  justified  a 
thousandfold. 

Never  was  the  need  of  exerting  sea  command  more 
urgent  than  at  the  outbreak  of  war.  Everything 
that  Englishmen  had  won  in  all  the  centuries  of  the 
storied  past  was  involved  in  the  quarrel.  Only  by 
mastery  of  the  sea  could  the  country  be  made 
secure.  Its  soil  had  never  been  trodden  by  an 
invader  since  Norman  William  came  in  1066.  The 
very  food  that  was  eaten  and  the  things  by  which 
the  industries  and  commerce  of  the  country  existed 
demanded  control  at  sea.  If  the  British  Empire  was 
to  be  safe  from  aggression  it  must  be  safeguarded  on  ■ 
every  sea.  If  England  was  to  set  armies  in  any 
foreign  field  of  operations,  and  to  retain  and  main- 
tain them  there,  with  the  gigantic  supplies  they 
would  require;  if  she  was  to  render  help  to  her 
Allies  in  men  or  munitions  or  anything  else,  whether 
they  came  from  England,  or  the  United  States,  or 
any  other  country,  and  were  landed  in  France, 
Russia,  Italy,  or  Greece,  or  in  Egypt,  Mesopotamia, 
or  East  or  West  Africa,  for  the  defeat  of  the  enemy, 
that  must  be  done  by  virtue  of  power  at  sea.  There- 
fore, in  this  war,  as  John  Hollond,  writing  his  Dis- 
course oj  the  Navy  in  1638,  said  of  the  wars  of  his 


4     The  Achievement  of  the  British  Navy 

time,  "the  naval  part  is  the  thread  that  runs  through 
the  whole  wooft,  the  burden  of  the  song,  the  scope  of 
the  text." 

The  moment  when  the  First  Fleet,  as  it  was  then 
called,  slipped  away  from  its  anchorage  at  Portland 
on  the  morning  of  Wednesday,  July  29th,  19 14,  will 
yet  be  regarded  as  one  of  the  decisive  moments  of 
history.  The  initiative  had  been  seized,  and  all  real 
initiative  was  thenceforward  denied  to  the  enemy. 
The  gauge  of  victory  had  been  won.  "Time  is  every- 
thing; five  minutes  makes  the  difference  between  a 
victory  and  a  defeat,"  said  Nelson.  "The  advantage 
and  gain  of  time  and  place  will  be  the  only  and 
chief  means  for  our  good,"  Drake  had  said  before 
him.  By  a  fortunate  circumstance,  which  should 
have  arrested  the  imagination  as  with  a  presage  of 
victory — a  circumstance  arranged  five  months  before, 
as  the  result  of  a  series  of  most  intricate  prepara- 
tions— time  and  place  were  both  on  the  British  side. 

The  First,  Second,  and  Third  Fleets,  and  the 
flotillas  attached  to  them,  had  been  mobilised  as  a 
test  operation,  and  inspected  at  Spithead  by  King 
George,  on  July  20th.  The  First  Fleet  had  returned 
to  Portland  and  the  other  fleets  to  their  home  ports, 
where  the  surplus  or  "balance"  crews  of  the  Naval 
Reserves  were  to  be  sent  on  shore.  Then  had  come 
the  now  famous  order  to  "stand  fast,"  issued  on 
the  night  of  Sunday,  July  26th,  which  had  stopped 
the  process  of  demobilisation.  Dark  clouds  had 
shadowed  the  international  horizon.  Austria-Hungary 
had  presented  her  ultimatum  to  Serbia.  She  declared 
war    on    the    28th.    The    Second    Fleet    remciined, 


Responsibilities  of  the  Sea  Service     5 

therefore,  in  proximity  to  its  reserves  of  men,  and  the 
men  were  ready  to  be  re-embarked  in  the  Third  Fleet. 

Few  people  realised  at  the  time  the  immense  sig- 
nificance of  the  memorable  eastward  movement  of  the 
squadrons  from  Portland  Roads,  or  of  the  assembly 
of  those  powerful  forces  at  their  northern  strategic 
anchorages.  Those  forces  became  the  Grand  Fleet, 
that  unexampled  organisation  of  fighting  force,  under 
command  of  that  fine  sea  officer,  Admiral  Sir  John 
Jellicoe.  War  was  declared  by  Great  Britain  on 
August  4th.  Successive  steps  of  supreme  importance 
were  taken,  which,  in  very  truth,  saved  the  cause  of 
the  Allies.  Disaster  and  surprise  attack  were  fore- 
stalled. The  Fleet,  fully  mobilised,  and  growing  daily 
in  strength,  was  already  exerting  command  of  the 
sea,  and  the  safe  transport  of  the  Expeditionary  Force 
to  France  was  assured.  Co-operation  with  the 
French  Fleet  was  immediately  established — its  cruiser 
squadron  in  the  Channel  and  its  battle  squadrons  in 
the  Mediterranean. 

Fighting  episodes  were  not  delayed,  but  for  many 
months  the  operations  of  the  Grand  Fleet  remained 
shrouded  as  by  a  veil,  lifted  only  on  rare  occasions. 
Few  people  knew  the  tremendous  anxieties  and 
responsibilities  of  the  British  Commander-in-Chief. 
His  vast  command  of  vessels  of  all  classes  and  uses 
had  to  be  organised  into  a  mighty  fleet,  complete  in 
every  element — battle  squadrons,  battle-cruiser  squad- 
rons, light-cruiser  squadrons,  flotillas  and  auxiliaries, 
transports,  hospital  ships,  and  every  ship  and  thing 
that  a  fleet  can  require.  A  whole  series  of  intricate 
dispositions  had  to  be  made.    Officers  were  to  be 


6     The  Achievement  of  the  British  Navy 

inspired  with  the  ideas  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  and 
the  whole  Fleet  was  to  be  so  trained,  under  squadron 
and  flotilla  commanders,  that  each  would  know  on  the 
instant  how  he  should  act. 

If  Nelson,  in  1789,  spent  many  hours  in  explaining 
to  his  "band  of  brothers"  his  plans  for  his  attack  at 
the  Nile,  with  fourteen  sail-of-the-line,  what  must  it 
have  been  for  Sir  John  Jellicoe  to  communicate  to  his 
officers,  and' discuss  with  them,  all  his  plans  for  every 
emergency  or  call  for  the  service  of  every  squadron 
and  ship  in  his  vast  command?  All  this  must  be 
realised  now.  And  during  the  anxious  early  months 
of  the  war,  as  the  winter  was  drawing  near,  the  great 
anchorages  were  as  yet  unprotected,  and  safety  from 
hostile  submarines  could  often  only  be  found  in  rapid 
steaming  at  sea.  The  mining  campaign  of  the  enemy 
had  also  to  be  overcome.  The  anxieties  were 
enormous,  and  it  was  only  the  power  of  command,  the 
sea  instinct,  the  deep  understanding,  the  readiness  to 
act  in  moments  of  extraordinary  responsibility,  and 
the  resource  and  professional  skill  of  the  Commander- 
in-Chief  and  his  staff  and  officers  in  command,  that 
enabled  the  tremendous  work  to  be  accomplished. 

WTiile  this  was  in  progress  other  work  of  immense 
significance  had  been  going  on.  The  Admiralty  had 
undertaken  a  gigantic  task  of  supreme  importance 
with  complete  success.  Great  defensive  preparations 
were  made  in  British  waters,  where  all  traffic  was 
regulated  and  controlled.  The  vast  maritime  re- 
sources of  the  country  were  added  to  the  naval 
service.  Two  battleships  building  for  Turkey,  another 
for  Chile,  and  certain  flotilla  leaders  and  other  craft 


i    -f' -■  'j  i   .'.Bll) 


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Responsibilities  of  the  Sea  Service     7 

building  in  the  country,  were  taken  over.  Officers 
and  rrien  in  abundance  were  ready.  The  magnificent 
seafaring  populations  of  the  merchant  marine  and 
the  fisheries  were  drawn  into  the  naval  service,  and 
subsequently  the  whole  mercantile  marine  was 
brought  under  naval  control,  and  for  practical 
purposes  was  embodied  with  the  Navy.  Officers  and 
men  of  these  services  showed  splendid  heroism  in  situ- 
ations of  terror  and  responsibility  never  anticipated. 

A  wide  network  of  patrols  was  brought  into  being; 
the  blockade  was  organised  and  strengthened;  the 
examination  services  were  set  on  foot  and  perfected; 
and  the  coast  sectors  of  defence,  with  their  flotillas, 
were  raised  to  a  standard  of  high  efficiency.  Mine- 
sweepers and  net-drifters  were  at  work.  Every  ship- 
yard in  the  country  and  a  multitude  of  engineering 
and  ammunition  works  began  to  buzz  with  work  for 
the  Navy  and  the  mercantile  marine.  Provision  was 
made  for  dealing  with  the  raiding  cruisers  and  armed 
merchantmen  of  the  enemy. 

At  the  time,  the  public  knew  little  or  nothing  of 
what  was  in  progress.  Imagination  fails  even  now 
to  grasp  the  magnitude  of  what  was  achieved.  The 
naval  share  in  the  campaign  was  of  baflBling  obscurity, 
while  the  stage  of  the  war  on  land  became  crowded 
with  fighting  men,  locked  in  a  terrible  conflict,  which 
at  that  time  seemed  to  bode  no  good  to  the  Allies. 
After  the  brush  in  the  Heligoland  Bight  on  August 
28th,  19 14,  the  Fleet  was  lost  to  view.  Not 
at  first,  but  slowly,  did  it  become  realised  that 
the  prognostications  of  peace-time  alarmists  had 
proved   baseless.    There   had   been   no   "bolt   from 


8     The  Achievement  of  the  British  Navy 

the  blue,"  as  had  been  foretold;  neither  invasion, 
nor  raid,  nor  foray  was  attempted  upon  British  shores, 
and  there  was  no  anxiety  about  food.  There  was 
always,  with  economy,  enough  to  eat. 

But  popular  confidence  seemed  for  a  time  to  be 
unreasonably  disturbed  by  a  record  of  successive 
alarming  and  generally  unexplained  incidents — the 
escape  of  the  Goeben  and  Breslau  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean, the  sinking  of  the  Aboukir,  Cressy,  Hague, 
Formidable,  and  other  vessels,  the  depredations  of 
German  raiding  cruisers  on  the  distant  lines  of  our 
trade,  the  bombardment  of  Hartlepool,  Whitby,  and 
Scarborough,  and  other  disquieting  episodes.  Strange 
as  it  may  seem,  there  were  people  who  went  about 
asking,  "What  is  the  Fleet  doing?"  Was  it  not  the 
ancient  inspiration  of  the  Navy  to  seek  out  the 
enemy  and  to  capture  or  sink  or  burn  his  ships 
wherever  they  were  to  be  found?  Yet  there  was  no 
battle.  The  German  coast  was  not  attacked.  Allied 
shipping  to  the  value  of  millions  of  pounds 
was  being  sunk.  Why,  then,  was  the  Navy  inactive? 
When,  later  on,  the  submarine  menace  assumed 
formidable  proportions,  alarm  began  again  to  seize 
upon  the  newspapers,  when  there  was  justification 
only  for  precaution. 

The  hidden  truth  was  not  comprehended.  Vic- 
tories were  expected  when,  owing  to  the  coyness  of 
the  enemy's  strategy,  none  were  possible.  The  Seven 
Years'  War — the  most  successful  in  British  annals, 
the  turning-point  in  British  history,  the  war  in 
which  Horace  Walpole  asked  each  morning  what 
victory     there     was     to     record — began     with  the 


Responsibilities  of  the  Sea  Service      9 

disaster  of  Minorca,  followed  by  the  tragedy  of 
Byng.  The  central  facts  of  naval  history  were 
but  little  known.  Yet  the  Navy  was,  and  is,  in 
truth,  all  in  all  to  the  country,  the  Empire,  and 
the  Allies. 

Before  we  enter  into  the  main  purpose  of  this  book, 
in  which  we  shall  discover  in  several  theatres  of  war 
the  real  nature  of  sea-power,  as  well  as  the  character 
and  momentous  consequences  of  the  antagonism  which 
grew  up  between  England  and  Germany,  we  may 
inquire  what  services  could  in  reason  have  been 
expected  from  the  Navy  in  the  great  cataclysm  which 
was  about  to  sweep  with  destruction  over  the  nations. 
It  would  not  have  been  expected  to  fight  a  battle 
every  month  or  even  every  year,  for  battles  are  rare 
events  in  naval  history.  It  would  not  have  been 
expected  to  attack  fortified  coasts,  though  it  might  do 
so  on  occasions,  because  ships  are  designed  and  built 
to  fight  at  sea.  The  Navy  would  not  have  been 
expected  to  forestall  every  untoward  incident.  Fish 
often  slip  through  the  net,  as  raiders  have  slipped 
through  our  guard  in  this  and  other  wars.  Nor,  in 
these  days  of  the  stealthy  submarine  and  the  blind 
death-dealing  mine,  could  the  Fleet  have  been 
expected  to  remain  immune  from  every  misfortune. 
No  one  could  have  expected  the  Navy  to  devise  a 
single  conclusive  defence  against  the  attack  of  the 
submarine,  any  more  than  it  was  asked  to  find  an 
infallible  remedy  for  the  effects  of  gunfire. 

What  we  should  have  expected  was  that  it  would 
make  the  sea  again  the  protecting  wall,  as  Shake- 
speare says,  of  the  British  Isles, 


10  The  Achievement  of  the  British  Navy 

Or  as  a  moat  defensive  to  a  house 
Against  the  envy  of  less  happier  lands. 

We  should  have  expected  it  to  safeguard  the  incoming 
of  the  supplies  without  which  neither  the  people  nor 
their  industries  could  exist — to  be  the  panoply  of  all 
trade  and  interests  afloat,  whether  in  the  nature  of 
imports  or  exports.  We  should  have  expected  it  to 
deny  all  external  activity  to  the  enemy  at  sea — we 
might  not  have  anticipated  the  advent  of  the  sub- 
marine as  a  pirate  commerce-destroyer — to  shut  off 
his  sea-borne  supplies,  and  to  exert  that  noiseless 
pressure  on  the  vitals  of  the  adversary  of  which 
Admiral  Mahan  speaks — ^"that  compulsion,  whose 
silence,  when  once  noted,  becomes  to  the  observer 
the  most  striking  and  awful  mark  of  the  working  of 
sea-power."  We  should  have  expected  the  Navy  to 
become  the  support,  in  thrust  and  holding,  of  the 
armies  in  the  field — the  shaft  to  their  spearhead; 
their  flank  and  rearguard  also.  Inasmuch  as  the 
war  is  world-wide,  and  we  have  powerful  Allies,  we 
should  have  expected  naval  influence  and  pressure  to 
be  manifested  in  the  oceans,  in  the  Mediterranean, 
and,  indeed,  wherever  the  enemy  is  and  the  seas  are. 
Finally,  we  should  have  expected  the  Navy  to  be  to 
the  British  Empire  what  it  has  always  been  to  the 
Empire's  heart — its  safeguard  from  injury  and  dis- 
ruption, and  the  bond  that  holds  it  together. 

Each  one  of  these  functions  has  been  executed  by 
in  Navy  with  triumphant  success  in  the  war,  and 
history  would  show  that  it  is  executing  them  now  as 
the  Sea  Service  has  accomplished  them  in  all  the  wars 
of  the  past. 


CHAPTER  II 

The  Centre  of  Sea-Power 

Of  speedy  victory  let  no  man  doubt, 

Our  worst  work's   past,   now  we  have  found  them  out. 

Behold,  their  navy  does  at  anchor  lie, 

And  they  are  ours,  for  now  they  cannot  fly. 

Andrew  Marvell,  1653. 

OF  all  the  theatres  of  the  war,  on  sea  or  land, 
the  North  Sea  is  the  most  important.  It  is 
vital  to  all  the  operations  of  the  Allies. 
Command  of  its  waters  and  its  outlets  is  the  thing 
that  matters  most.  In  that  sea  is  the  centre  of 
naval  influence.  It  is  the  key  of  all  the  hostilities. 
From  either  side  of  it  the  great  protagonists  in  the 
struggle  look  at  one  another.  There  the  great 
constriction  of  the  blockade  is  exerted  upon 
Germany.  It  is  the  mare  clausum  against  which  she 
protests.  Geography  is  there  in  the  scales  against 
her.  She  rebels  against  British  sea  supremacy. 
The  "freedom  of  the  seas"  is,  therefore,  her  claim — 
though  she  is  endeavouring  to  qualify  to  be  the  tyrant 
of  them.  Her  only  outlook  towards  the  outer  seas  is 
from  the  Bight  of  Heligoland  and  the  fringe  of  coast 
behind  the  East  Frisian  Islands,  or  from  the  Baltic, 
if  her  ships  pass  the  Sound  or  the  Belt,  issuing  into 

See  Map  L,  at  end  of  book. 
11 


12  The  Achievement  of  the  British  Navy 

the  North  Sea  through  the  Skager-Rak.  But  they 
cannot  reach  the  ocean,  except  through  the  North 
Passage,  where  the  Grand  Fleet  holds  the  guard. 
Only  isolated  raiders,  bent  upon  predatory  enterprise, 
have  stealthily  gone  that  way  after  nightfall.  At  the 
southern  gate  of  the  North  Sea,  through  the  Straits 
of  Dover  and  in  the  Channel,  the  way  is  barred. 
The  guns  of  Dover,  the  Dover  Patrol,  and  certain 
other  deterrents  forbid  the  enemy  to  adventure  in 
that  direction. 

The  new  engines  of  naval  warfare — the  mine, 
submarine,  airship,  and  aeroplane — found  their  first 
and  greatest  use  in  the  North  Sea;  and  only  by 
employing  craft  which  hide  beneath  the  water,  a^d, 
on  rare  occasions,  by  destroyers  which  seek  the  cover 
of  darkness  for  local  forays,  have  the  Germans  been 
able  to  exert  their  efforts  in  any  waters  outside  the 
North  Sea.  At  the  beginning  of  the  war  they  had 
raiding  cruisers  in  the  Pacific  and  Atlantic,  and  a 
detached  squadron  in  the  Far  East;  but  the  British 
Fleet  reached  out  to  those  regions,  and,  aided  by  the 
warships  of  Japan  and  France,  it  drove  every  vestige 
of  German  naval  power  from  the  oceans. 

In  the  North  Sea,  therefore,  sea-power  has  exerted 
its  greatest,  most  vital,  and  most  far-reaching  effect. 
There  the  Germans,  if  they  had  possessed  the  power, 
could  have  struck  a  blow  which,  if  successful  for 
them,  would  have  proved  a  mortal  stroke  at  the 
British  Empire  and  would  have  rendered  useless  all 
the  efforts  of  the  Allies.  Millions  of  men,  incalculable 
volumes  of  guns,  munitions,  and  stores  of  every  imag- 
inable kind  for  the  use  of  the  greatest  armies  ever 


The  Centre  of  Sea-Power  13 

set  in  the  field,  have  entered  the  French  ports  solely 
because  the  Grand  Fleet  holds  the  guard  in  the 
North  Sea.  The  whole  face  of  the  world  would  have 
been  changed  by  German  naval  victory.  England 
would  have  been  subjected  by  invasion  and  famine. 
If  the  heart  of  the  Empire  had  been  struck,  what 
would  have  been  the  future  of  its  members?  If  sea 
communication  with  the  Allies  had  been  cut,  what 
would  have  been  their  fate  at  the  hands  of  the  victors? 
The  attacks  of  sallying  cruisers  and  destroyers  upon 
the  coast  towns  of  England,  the  "tip  and  run"  raids, 
as  they  have  been  called,  and  the  visits  of  bomb- 
dropping  airships  and  aeroplanes  are  the  signs  of  the 
naval  impotence  of  Germany, 

The  situation  in  the  North  Sea  is,  therefore,  of 
absorbing  interest.  It  may  be  studied  chiefly  from 
the  two  points  of  view  of  the  strategy  of  the  opposing 
fleets  and  the  exercise  of  the  blockade.  There  is  a 
peculiarity  in  naval  warfare,  which  is  not  found  in 
warfare  upon  land,  that  a  belligerent  can  withdraw 
his  naval  forces  entirely  from  the  theatre  of  war  by 
retaining  them,  as  with  a  threat,  or  in  a  position  of 
weakness,  behind  the  guns  of  his  shore  defences. 
Nothing  of  the  kind  is  possible  with  land  armies.  A 
general  can  always  find  his  enemy,  and  attack  or 
invest  him,  and,  if  successful,  drive  him  back,  or 
cause  him  to  surrender,  and  occupy  the  territory  he 
has  held.  The  Germans  have  chosen  the  reticent 
strategy  of  the  sea.  They  have  never  come  out  to 
make  a  fight  to  a  finish,  to  put  the  matter  to  the 
touch,  "to  gain  or  lose  it  all."  The  animus  pugnandi 
is  wanting  to  their  fleet.    It  was  necessary  that  they 


14  The  Achievement  of  the  British  Navy 

should  do  something.  They  could  not  lie  for  ever 
stagnant  at  Kiel  and  Wilhelmshaven.  They  could 
keep  their  officers  and  men  in  training  by  making 
brief  cruises  in  and  outside  the  Bight  of  Heligoland. 
They  might,  with  luck,  meet  some  portion  of  the 
Grand  Fleet  detached  and  at  a  disadvantage. 

In  any  case,  they  were  bold  enough  to  take  their 
chance  on  occasions,  always  with  their  fortified  ports 
and  mined  waters  and  their  submarines  under  their 
lee.  They  might  succeed  in  reducing  British  supe- 
riority by  the  "attrition"  of  some  encounters.  Such 
was  the  genesis  of  the  Dogger  Bank  battle  of 
January  24th,  191 5,  when  that  gallant  officer  Sir 
David  Beatty  inflicted  a  severe  defeat  upon  Admiral 
Hipper,  and  drove  him  back  in  flight,  with  the  loss 
of  the  Blucher  and  much  other  injury.  The  same 
causes  brought  the  German  High  Sea  Fleet,  under 
Admiral  Scheer,  into  the  great  conflict,  first  with  Sir 
David  Beatty,  and  then  with  the  main  force  of  the 
Grand  Fleet,  under  command  of  Sir  John  Jellicoe, 
on  May  31st,  19 16.  The  events  of  the  great  engage- 
ment of  the  Jutland  Bank  will  not  be  related  here. 
All  that  it  is  necessary  to  note  is  that  the  Germans 
had  so  chosen  their  time  that  they  were  able  to 
avoid  decisive  battle  with  Sir  John  Jellicoe's  fleet  by 
retreating  in  the  failing  light  of  the  day,  and  that 
their  adventure  availed  them  nothing  to  break  the 
blockade  or  otherwise  to  modify  the  impotent  position 
in  which  they  are  placed  at  sea.  That  action  operated 
to  the  disadvantage  of  England  and  her  Allies  in  no 
degree  whatever.  The  superiority  of  the  British  Fleet 
as  a  fighting  engine  had  been  placed  beyond  dispute. 


The  Centre  of  Sea-Power  15 

The  mine  and  the  submarine  have  put  an  end  to 
the  system  of  naval  blockade  as  practised  by  St. 
Vincent  and  Cornwallis.  No  fleet  can  now  lie  off, 
or  within  striking  range  of,  an  enemy's  port.  Battle- 
ships cannot  be  risked  against  submarines,  acting 
either  as  torpedo  craft  or  mine-layers,  nor  against 
swift  destroyers  at  night.  That  is  the  explanation 
of  the  situation  which  has  arisen  in  the  North  Sea. 
The  blockade  is  necessarily  of  a  distant  kind.  There 
are  no  places  on  the  British  coasts  where  the  Grand 
Fleet  could  be  located,  except  those  in  which  it  lies 
and  from  which  it  issues  to  sweep  the  North  Sea 
periodically.  The  first  essential  is  to  control  the 
enemy's  communications,  which  is  done  effectively  at 
the  North  Passage — between  the  Orkneys  and 
Shetlands,  and  the  Norwegian  coast — and  at  the 
Straits  of  Dover.  If  the  enemy  desired  a  final 
struggle  for  supremacy  at  sea,  with  all  its  tremendous 
consequences,  he  could  have  it.  But  he  can  be 
attacked  only  when  he  is  accessible.  "There  shall 
be  neither  sickness  nor  death  which  shall  make  us 
yield  until  this  service  be  ended,"  wrote  Howard  in 
1588.  That  is  the  spirit  of  the  British  Navy  to-day. 
But,  then,  the  Spanish  Armada  was  at  sea.  It  was 
not  hiding  behind  its  shore  defences.  Be  it  noted 
that  the  Germans,  thus  hiding  themselves,  enjoy  a 
certain  opportunity  of  undertaking  raiding  operations 
in  the  North  Sea.  It  is  not  a  difficult  thing  to  rush  a 
force  of  destroyers  on  a  dark  night  against  some  point 
in  an  extended  line  of  patrols  and  effect  a  little  damage 
somewhere.  What  advantage  the  Germans  hope  to 
gain  by  such  proceedings  is  difficult  to  discover. 


16  The  Achievement  of  the  British  Navy 

The  magnificence  of  the  work  of  the  British  patrol 
flotillas  and  the  auxiliary  patrols  must  be  recognised. 
In  the  North  Sea  these  are  subsidiary  services  of  the 
Grand  Fleet.  Day  and  night,  in  every  weather — 
in  summer  heats  and  winter  blasts  and  blizzards, 
when  icy  seas  wash  the  boats  from  stem  to  stern  and 
the  cold  penetrates  to  the  bone — these  patrols  are 
at  work.  The  records  of  heroism  at  sea  in  these 
services  have  never  been  surpassed,  and  England  owes 
a  very  great  deal  to  the  men  who  came  to  her  service. 
The  mercantile  marine  has  given  its  vessels  to  the 
State,  from  the  luxurious  liner  to  the  fishing  trawler, 
and  officers  and  men  have  come  in  who  have  rendered 
priceless  services.  The  trawlers  have  carried  on  their 
perilous  work  of  bringing  up  the  strange  harvest  of 
horned  mines  by  the  score.  The  patrol  boats  have 
examined  suspicious  vessels,  controlled  sea  traffic,  and 
watched  the  sea  passages.  The  destroyer  flotillas 
have  been  constantly  at  work  and  ready  at  any  time 
to  bring  raiding  enemy  forces  to  action.  The  Royal 
Naval  Air  Service  has  never  relaxed  its  activity  and 
has  engaged  in  countless  combats. 

It  has  sometimes  been  wondered  why  the  Grand 
Fleet  did  not  take  some  aggressive  action:  Why  did 
it  not  attack  the  North  German  sea  coast,  or  rout  out 
the  pestilent  hornets'  nest  of  Zeebrugge,  which  the 
enemy,  by  internal  communications  impregnable  to 
sea-power,  had  provided  with  the  most  powerful  guns, 
besides  defending  it  by  great  mine-fields?  This  mat- 
ter requires  to  be  examined.  Naval  history  abounds 
with  evidence  that  to  attack  coast  defences  is  not  the 
proper  or  even  the  permissible  work  of  warships.    It 


The  Centre  of  Sea-Power  17 

is  the  business  of  military  forces,  though  naval  forces 
may  often  assist,  and  even  give  the  means  of  victory. 
Moreover,  what  was  once  possible  is  not  possible  now. 
Would  Nelson  have  attacked  the  French  Fleet  at  the 
Nile  if  it  had  lain  under  the  powerful  guns  of  these 
days,  and  behind  mine-fields,  through  the  secret  pas- 
sages of  which  submarines  could  have  issued  to 
destroy  him?  It  would  be  absurd  to  compare  Nelson's 
attack  upon  a  line  of  block-ships  and  rafts  at  Copen- 
hagen, covered  by  a  few  forts  armed  with  old  smooth- 
bores, to  an  attack  upon  coast  positions  defended  by 
modern  guns. 

When  old  Sir  Charles  Napier  was  in  the  Baltic  in 
1854  he  was  denounced  at  home  because  he  did  not 
destroy  Kronstadt  or  Helsingfors.  He  rightly  refused 
to  play  his  enemy's  game  by  endangering  his  ships. 
Captain  (afterwards  Admiral  Sir)  B.  J.  Sulivan,  who 
was  with  the  fleet,  put  the  situation  quite  clearly  in  a 
letter  written  at  the  time.  A  military  operation 
was  really  required  then,  as  it  would  be  now,  to 
accomplish  such  a  task. 

We  know  that  two  guns  have  beaten  off  two  large 
ships  with  great  loss.  Had  Nelson  been  here  with 
thirty  English  ships  he  would  have  blockaded  the 
gulf  for  years,  without  thinking  of  attacking  such 
fortresses  to  get  at  ships  inside.  Brest,  Toulon,  and 
Cadiz  were  probably  much  weaker  than  these 
places.  ...  I  suppose  there  will  be  an  outcry  at 
home  about  doing  nothing  here,  but  we  might  as 
well  try  to  reach  the  moon. 

But  the  Navy  has  never  left  the  Belgian  coast 
secure  from  attack.    It  has  never  lost  its  aggressive 


18  The  Achievement  of  the  British  Navy 

spirit.  It  has  attacked  from  the  ship  and  the  air. 
The  seaplanes  of  the  Royal  Naval  Air  Service 
spotted  for  the  guns  when  the  monitors  were  bom- 
barding. Bombs  have  repeatedly  been  dropped  on 
Ostend,  Zeebrugge,  and  the  places  in  the  rear. 
When  the  guns  were  silent  there  were  reasons  for  it. 
A  conjoint  naval  and  military  expedition  was  required. 
The  enemy  began  to  feel  his  hold  on  the  coast  pre- 
carious. Continued  operations  by  sea  and  land  might 
compel  him  to  relax  his  grasp.  Ships  may  not  attack 
places  defended  by  big  guns,  mine-fields,  and  subma- 
rines and  destroyers  issuing  from  secret  passages 
through  them,  but  it  is  certain  the  British  naval 
offensive  will  never  be  paralysed. 

Such  is  the  magnificent  work  of  the  British  Navy 
in  blockading  the  German  Fleet,  molesting  the 
enemy's  coast  positions,  and  controlling  his  com- 
munications with  the  oceans. 

The  commercial  blockade,  by  which  the  enemy's 
supplies  and  commodities  are  cut  off  and  his  exports 
paralysed,  is  too  large  a  subject  to  be  dealt  with  here. 
The  object  is  to  bring  the  full  measure  of  sea-power 
to  bear  in  crushing  the  national  life  of  the  enemy.  It 
is  vital  but  ''silent"  work  of  the  Navy,  and  does  not 
lend  itself  to  discussion  or  description.  Questions  of 
contraband  and  the  right  and  method  of  search,  which 
arise  from  the  blockade,  caused  discussions  with  the 
United  States  before  the  States  came  into  the  war. 
The  only  object  of  the  British  Navy  and  the  Foreign 
Office  was  to  put  an  end  to  the  transit  of  the  enemy's 
commodities,  and  to  do  so  with  the  utmost  considera- 
tion for  the  interests  of  neutrals,  and  complete  pro- 


The  Centre  of  Sea-Power  19 

tection  for  the  lives  of  the  officers  and  crews  in  their 
ships  and  in  the  examining  ships.  For  these  reasons 
neutral  vessels  were  taken  into  port  for  examination, 
safe  from  the  attentions  of  the  enemy's  submarines. 
One  great  hope  of  the  Germans  was  that  the  neutrals 
would  become  more  and  more  exasperated  with 
England.  They  remembered  that  the  war  of  1812 
arose  from  this  very  cause.  But  they  were  com- 
pletely disappointed  in  all  such  hopes,  and  they 
themselves,  by  interfering  with  the  free  navigation 
of  other  countries,  brought  the  United  States  into  the 
war  against  them. 

The  blockade  work  of  the  examination  service  and 
of  the  armed  boarding  steamers  has  been  extremely 
hazardous.  It  has  called  for  the  greatest  qualities 
of  seamanship,  because  conducted  in  every  condition 
of  weather  and  when  storm  and  fog  have  made  it 
extremely  perilous  to  approach  the  neutral  vessels 
— which,  moreover,  have  sometimes  proved  to  be 
armed  enemies  in  disguise.  Hundreds  of  vessels  have 
been  brought  into  port  by  the  Navy  in  those  northern 
waters.  Sleepless  vigilance  has  been  required  and  the 
highest  skill  of  the  sea  in  every  possible  condition  of 
the  service,  while  the  seaman  has  become  a  statesman 
in  his  dealings  with  the  neutral  shipmaster.  It  has 
been  for  the  Navy  to  bring  the  ships  into  port,  and  for 
other  authorities  to  inquire  into  their  status  and  to 
take  them  before  the  Prize  Court  if  required. 

The  German  High  Sea  Fleet  having  failed,  the 
submarine  campaign  was  instituted,  and  began 
chiefly  in  the  North  Sea.  It  has  never  answered  the 
expectations  of  its  authors.    It  has  not  changed  the 


20  The  Achievement  of  the  British  Navy- 
strategic  situation  in  any  degree  whatever.  Great 
damage  has  been  inflicted  upon  British  interests, 
and  valuable  ships  and  cargoes  have  been  sunk,  and 
officers  and  men  cast  adrift  in  situations  of  ruthless 
hardship.  The  tale  of  the  sea  has  never  had  a  more 
terrible  record,  nor  one  lighted  by  so  much  noble 
self-sacrifice  and  unfailing  courage. 


CHAPTER  III 

Sweeping  the  Enemy  from  the  Oceans 

Far  flung  the  Fleet  then, 

Freeing  the  seas, 
Clearing    the    way    for    men, 

Merchantmen  these. 
Sinking  or  flying, 

Broken  their  power, 
The  enemy  dying 

Left  England  her  dower. 

/.  L. 

IN  the  foregoing  chapter  some  reference  was  made 
to  the  campaign  of  the  German  raiding  cruisers 
and  armed  hners  against  British  and  AlUed 
commerce  in  the  distant  waters  of  the  Atlantic  and 
Pacific  during  the  early  months  of  hostilities,  and 
before  we  go  any  further  this  aspect  of  the  war  must 
be  discussed.  One  object  of  the  enemy  was  to  lead 
to  a  scattering  of  British  naval  strength,  but  in  this 
he  was  wholly  disappointed.  The  distribution  of  the 
British  Fleet  remained  unchanged,  and  the  great 
numbers  of  swift  cruisers  and  armed  Hners,  which 
had  been  apprehended  as  presenting  a  formidable 
menace  to  commerce,  made  but  a  feeble  appearance. 
The  commerce-raiding  campaign  gave  rise,  however, 
to  a  good  deal  of  alarm  at  the  time,  though  it  sur- 
prised no  one  who  understood  the  means  made  avail- 
able by  the  scientific  and  mechanical  developments 

21 


22  The  Achievement  of  the  British  Navy 

of  modern  naval  warfare,  and  who  had  studied  them 
in  the  light  of  history. 

The  interruption  or  destruction  of  the  enemy's 
commerce  has  always  been  one  of  the  objects  in 
naval  warfare.  British  floating  commerce  offered  a 
very  large  target,  and  the  swift  German  cruisers, 
directed  by  wireless  telegraphy  and  supplied  by 
friendly  neutrals,  were  at  work  on  the  lines  followed 
by  shipping,  making  it  inevitable  that  there  should 
at  first  be  considerable  losses  to  the  Allies.  Admiral 
Mahan  thought  that  the  British  total  losses  in  the 
long  wars  of  the  French  Revolution  and  Empire 
did  not  exceed  2^2  per  cent,  of  the  commerce  of  the 
Empire.  The  Royal  Commission  on  the  Supply  of 
Food  in  Time  of  War  expressed  the  opinion  that 
4  per  cent,  would  have  been  a  more  accurate  estimate. 

German  cruisers,  destructive  as  a  few  of  them  were, 
did  not  inflict  losses  amounting  to  anything  like  the 
figures  of  the  old  wars.  In  those  contests  of  power, 
notwithstanding  the  depredations  of  commerce- 
destroying  frigates,  British  oversea  trade  grew, 
while  that  of  the  enemy  withered  away.  If  the 
enemy  captured  ten  British  ships  out  of  a  thousand 
the  loss  might  be  considered  serious,  but  if  the 
British  frigates  captured  ten  out  of  the  enemy's 
hundred  the  injury  inflicted  was  ten  times  more 
effective.  Towards  the  end  of  the  long  war  with 
France  very  few  French  traders  were  captured 
because  scarcely  any  ventured  to  sea,  while  the 
French  continued  to  capture  English  ships  up  to 
the  very  end  of  the  war,  ten  years  after  their  fleet  had 
been  destroyed  at  Trafalgar.    The  loss  by  capture 


Sweeping  the  Oceans  23 

and  sinking  was  at  the  rate  of  500  ships  a  year,  and 
even  in  1810,  619  English  ships  were  lost. 

In  the  present  war  the  German  commerce- 
destroying  campaign,  by  means  of  cruisers  and 
armed  liners,  though  very  effective  at  the  beginning, 
collapsed  with  great  rapidity.  Hostile  action  against 
trade  has  never  before  been  so  rapidly  brought 
under  control.  Steam,  the  telegraph,  and  wireless 
have  enormously  increased,  as  compared  with  the 
sailing  days,  the  thoroughness  and  efficiency  of 
superior  sea-power.  Difficulty  of  providing  for  coal 
and  oil  supply,  the  want  of  naval  repairing  and 
docking  bases,  and,  above  all,  the  immense  superiority 
brought  quickly  to  bear  by  the  combined  naval 
forces  of  England,  France,  and  Japan,  aided  by  the 
Australian  Navy  (auxiliary  to  the  British,  to  which 
it  belonged),  within  a  comparatively  short  time 
caused  the  whole  of  German  commerce  to  disappear 
from  the  oceans.  Soon  not  a  single  ship  remained — 
trader,  cruiser,  or  armed  liner — as  a  target,  except  that 
such  isolated  raiders  as  the  Mowe  might  offer  rare 
opportunities  of  attack.  This  failure  of  the  Germans 
seemed  the  more  remarkable  because  they  had  long 
recognised  the  floating  commerce  of  England  to  be 
her  Achilles'  heel.  Prince  Billow  described  it  as  such. 
They  had  expressly  reserved,  at  The  Hague  Confer- 
ence, the  right  to  convert  merchantmen  into  cruisers 
on  the  high  seas  to  serve  as  commerce-destroyers. 
They  used  this  right  in  some  instances,  as  in  that  of 
the  Cap  Trafalgar,  which  was  sunk  in  single-ship 
action  by  the  British  converted  liner  Carmania.  Yet 
this  procedure  proved  of  no  effect  in  the  war. 


24  The  Achievement  of  the  British  Navy- 
It  would  be  a  great  mistake  to  regard  the  German 
cruiser  campaign  against  commerce  apart  from  the 
general  distribution  of  German  warships  and  the 
means  taken  to  supply  them  with  their  requirements. 
The  writer  is  inclined  to  the  belief  that  the  impotence 
of  the  Germans  in  distant  waters  shows  that  their 
Navy  was  not  ready  nor  effectively  prepared  for  the 
war.  The  great  expenditure  on  the  High  Sea  Fleet 
proved  unavailing.  The  submarine  boats  did  not  exist 
in  any  considerable  number.  Only  about  twenty-seven 
or  twenty-eight  of  them  were  completed  in  August, 
19 14,  of  which  about  a  dozen  were  of  early  experi- 
mental type,  fit  only  for  local  use,  and  the  programme 
provided  only  for  the  building  of  half  a  dozen  in  each 
year.  The  German  Navy  possessed  not  more  than  a 
couple  of  big  airships,  and  a  few  effective  aeroplanes. 
The  cruisers  on  foreign  service  were  scattered  about 
the  world  without  plan.  The  battle-cruiser  Goeben 
and  the  light  cruiser  Breslau  had  been  detached  in 
the  Mediterranean  during  the  Balkan  War,  and, 
according  to  the  Greek  White  Book,  Turkey  having 
entered  into  alliance  with  Germany  on  August  4th, 
the  two  cruisers  fled  to  the  Dardanelles  in  conformity 
with  orders  received  from  Berlin.  The  Germans  were 
apprehensive  as  to  their  safety,  and  their  naval 
authorities  never  intended  to  leave  them  in  their 
dangerous  situation  of  isolation  in  an  Italian  port. 
The  business  of  controlling  and  directing  the  opera- 
tions of  the  commerce-destroying  cruisers  and  armed 
liners,  and  providing  their  supplies,  was  admittedly 
dexterously  arranged  by  the  agency  of  wireless, 
mainly   through   the  means  placed   at  disposal   by 


Sweeping  the  Oceans  25 

German  sympathisers  in  the  United  States,  the  States 
of  Southern  America,  and  other  neutral  coimtries, 
though  nothing  they  did  could  withstand  the  steady 
pressure  of  sea-power. 

The  most  considerable  German  force  in  distant 
waters  was  the  East  Asian  Squadron,  under  command 
of  Admiral  Count  von  Spee.  It  was  located 
at  Kiao-Chau,  and  its  principal  elements  were  the 
armoured  cruisers  Scharnhorst  and  Gneisenau.  Sooner 
or  later  this  squadron  was  bound  to  be  defeated,  as 
its  commanding  officer  fully  realised.  The  Japanese 
declared  war  on  August  23rd,  and  the  fleets  of 
Admiral  Baron  Dewa  and  Admiral  Kato  were 
stretched  out  to  blockade  and  intercept  him;  but  he 
extricated  himself  very  dexterously,  crossed  the 
Pacific,  defeated  Admiral  Sir  Christopher  Craddock 
off  Coronel  on  November  ist,  rounded  Cape  Horn, 
and  was  himself  defeated  with  the  loss  of  his  whole 
squadron  in  the  battle  of  the  Falkland  Isles  on 
December  8th.  One  of  his  cruisers,  the  Emden, 
which  had  escaped  the  Japanese,  made  a  great  noise 
in  the  world.  Her  captain  was  a  very  capable  and 
also  a  very  gallant  officer,  who  bombarded  oil  tanks 
at  Madras,  sank  the  Russian  cruiser  Jemtchug  and 
the  French  destroyer  Mousquet  at  Penang,  and  sent 
to  the  bottom  seventeen  British  vessels,  representing 
a  value  of  £2,211,000,  besides  three  sent  into  port. 
The  Emden  was  destroyed  by  H.M.  Australian 
cruiser  Sydney  at  the  Cocos-Keeling  Islands  on 
November  8th.  The  Karlsruhe  sank  vessels  repre- 
senting a  value  of  £1,662,000. 

It  is  not  the  purpose  here  to  describe  the  depreda- 


26  The  Achievement  of  the  British  Navy 

tions  and  ocean  wanderings  of  the  other  German 
cruisers  or  auxiliary  cruisers.  The  object  is  to  show 
how,  by  the  all-compassing  pressure  of  naval  power, 
they  were  successively  destroyed.  It  would  be  folly 
to  deny  that  there  was  something  defective  in 
the  disposition  of  the  British  naval  forces  at  the 
beginning.  Admiral  von  Spee  was  at  large,  with  two 
powerful  armoured  cruisers,  but  Sir  Christopher 
Craddock  was  left  in  inferior  force  off  the  coast  of 
Chile.  The  obsolescent  battleship  Canopus,  which 
had  inferior  speed,  was  to  join  him,  but  did  not 
reach  him  in  time.  The  Australian  battle-cruiser 
Australia,  which  would  have  been  an  extremely  valu- 
able aid  to  Craddock's  squadron,  did  not  pursue  the 
German  squadron  across  the  Pacific. 

Admiral  of  the  Fleet  Lord  Fisher  returned  to  the 
Admiralty  as  First  Sea  Lord  on  October  29th,  19 14, 
and  at  once  set  about  to  use  the  naval  instrument  he 
had  been  so  largely  instrumental  in  creating.  In 
dead  secrecy  and  with  incredible  speed  a  force  was 
prepared  and  dispatched.  Admiral  Sturdee  had  with 
him  the  magnificent  battle-cruisers  Invincible  and 
Inflexible,  the  armoured  cruisers  Kent,  Cornwall,  and 
Carnarvon,  the  light  cruisers  Bristol  and  Glasgow,  and 
the  armed  liner  Macedonia.  The  battleship  Canoptis 
was  already  at  Port  Stanley.  Before  anyone  knew 
he  had  left  England,  he  arrived  at  the  Falkland 
Islands  on  December  7th,  after  having  steamed  a 
distance  of  7,000  miles.  The  German  Admiral  was 
known  to  be  approaching  with  the  object  of  utilising 
the  islands  as  a  base.  He  arrived  on  the  next  day, 
but  was  taken  by  complete  surprise,  though  he  was 


Sweeping  the  Oceans  27 

conscious  of  impending  fate,  and  his  squadron  ceased 
to  exist. 

This  was  one  of  the  master-strokes  of  the  war, 
made  with  lightning  rapidity.  Strategy  was  seen  in 
action,  and  thenceforward  the  control  of  the  ocean 
was  secured.  There  remained  the  business  of  round- 
ing up  the  enemy  cruisers  which  were  still  preying 
upon  shipping  on  the  routes  of  commerce.  Cruisers 
of  sufficient  force  were  dispatched,  with  instructions 
to  remain  at  certain  rendezvous,  each  forming  a  base 
upon  which  lighter  cruisers  could  fall  back,  or  to 
the  support  of  which  they  could  proceed.  The  lighter 
vessels  cruised  on  specified  curves  or  lines  of  search, 
and  in  this  way  a  network  was  spread  over  the  oceans 
comparable  to  a  spider's  web.  Thus  in  due  course 
every  enemy  cruiser  and  auxiliary  was  intercepted,  or, 
conscious  of  the  toils  which  were  spread  for  her, 
abandoned  her  task  and  sought  safety  in  the  intern- 
ment of  a  neutral  port.  The  Grand  Fleet  in  the 
North  Sea  was  the  master  of  the  situation,  and  made 
possible  the  decisive  blow  which  was  struck  at  enemy 
power  in  the  oceans. 

Thenceforward  the  enemy  was  impotent  in  every 
sea.  Not  a  man  could  he  send  afloat  to  bring  aid  to 
his  colonies  and  protectorates.  His  distant  posses- 
sions collapsed  like  a  house  built  of  cards.  No  means 
had  he  to  interrupt  the  transport  of  troops  which  have 
brought  about  the  darkening  of  every  German 
"place  in  the  sun."  "Deutschland  ist  Weltreich 
geworden,"  it  was  said.  But  distant  possessions  are 
the  ripe  fruit  which  falls  into  the  lap  of  the  ultimate 
sea-power,  and  the  Weltreich  exists  no  more.    By 


28  The  Achievement  of  the  British  Navy 

means  of  sea-power  it  has  been  destroyed.  The  sub- 
marine is  an  effective  weapon  within  its  sphere,  but 
no  victory  has  ever  been  won  by  evasion,  and  no  sea- 
power  can  be  exercised  by  stealthy  craft  which  hide 
beneath  the  surface  of  the  sea. 


CHAPTER  IV 
The  Grasp  of  the  Mediterranean 

sea-  and  land-power 

Others  may  use  the  ocean  as  their  road, 
Only  the  EngHsh  make  it  their  abode; 
Our  oaks  secure,  as  if  they  there  took  root, 
We  tread  on  billows  with  a  steady  foot. 

Edmund  Waller,  1656. 

IT  is  important  next  to  consider  the  situation  in 
the  Mediterranean,  where  sea-power  is  of  mo- 
mentous importance  to  the  Allies.  In  those 
historic  waters  the  fate  of  many  nations  has  been 
decided.  They  are  a  vital  link  and  the  highway  of  the 
British  Empire.  Between  Gibraltar  and  Port  Said 
two  thousand  miles  of  British  welfare  lie  outrolled. 
To  France,  with  her  great  possessions  in  Algeria, 
Morocco,  and  Tunis,  the  importance  of  this  sea 
highway  is  supreme.  She  must,  in  this  war 
and  at  all  times,  traverse  its  waters  or  she  will  be 
undone.  Italy  has  won  a  great  position  in  the 
Adriatic  and  the  Mediterranean,  and  she  would 
wither  away  and  perish  if  either  fell  under  enemy 
control.  Trieste  is  her  object,  and  she  has  pro- 
claimed a  protectorate  over  Albania  the  better  to 
establish  her  power  in  the  Adriatic,  and  she  has  her 

See  Map  II.,  at  end  of  book. 
29 


30  The  Achievement  of  the  British  Navy 

new  possessions  in  the  Libia  Italiana  of  Northern 
Africa.  From  the  operations  in  the  Mediterranean 
we  shall  learn  something  more  of  the  relation  of  sea- 
power  to  land  operations,  and  of  the  limitations  of 
that  power,  and  we  shall  see  the  allied  navies  of 
England,  France,  Russia,  Italy,  and  Japan  in  co-oper- 
ation. We  shall  know  why  the  enemy  made  a  great 
submarine  stroke  in  the  Mediterranean  when  every- 
thing else  at  sea  had  failed. 

The  French  battleship  squadrons  were  concen- 
trated in  the  Mediterranean  before  the  war.  The 
cruiser  squadron  in  the  Channel,  like  David  against 
Goliath,  was  willing  to  encounter  even  the  whole 
German  High  Sea  Fleet;  but  the  French  had  been 
assured  of  British  co-operation,  and  all  danger  was 
forestalled.  In  the  Mediterranean  the  Goeben  and 
Breslau  had  come  west,  and  had  bombarded  Bona 
and  Philippeville;  but  the  French  Admiral,  going 
south  from  Toulon,  was  on  their  heels,  and  they 
fled  to  the  east  again,  running  the  gauntlet  of  the 
British  squadron  on  their  way  to  join  the  Turks. 

They  had  intended  to  raid  the  French  transports 
at  sea.  At  this  time  the  French  were  bringing  their 
troops  from  Algeria  and  Tunis,  amounting  in  all  to 
nearly  100,000  men,  with  guns,  horses,  mules,  stores, 
ammunition,  hospitals,  tent  equipment,  and  all  the 
requirements  for  field  service,  to  join  the  main  army 
in  France.  It  was  a  great  responsibility  for  the 
French  Navy,  increased  many-fold  when  troops  began 
to  come  from  their  eastern  possessions  through  the 
Suez  Canal. 

Failure    would    have    meant    disaster.    But    the 


The  Grasp  of  the  Mediterranean    31 

whole  of  the  transport  work  was  managed  without 
the  loss  of  a  man  or  a  horse,  and  was  a  wonderful 
success.  It  could  hardly  have  taken  place  with  so 
much  security  if  the  British  squadron  had  not  been 
in  the  Mediterranean,  and  not  at  all  if  the  Grand 
Fleet  had  not  held  the  German  High  Sea  Fleet  fast 
in  its  ports  by  the  blockade  in  the  North  Sea.  From 
that  time  forward  for  many  months,  until  the 
ItaUans  came  into  the  war,  on  May  23rd,  191 5,  the 
French  squadron  was  employed  in  neutralising  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Fleet  in  the  Adriatic,  which  did  not 
dare  to  move.  The  blockading  squadron  was 
extended  across  the  Strait  of  Otranto,  with  occasional 
sweeps  to  the  northward,  to  control  hostile  operations, 
if  possible,  at  Cattaro  and  along  the  Dalmatian  coast 
up  to  the  approaches  to  Pola,  where  the  submarine 
Citrie  was  entangled,  and  lost  to  the  Austrians.  The 
French  base  for  these  operations  was  at  Malta,  but 
an  advanced  base  was  established  in  the  island  of 
Lissa.  The  blockade  was  completely  successful  in 
checking  every  effort  of  the  Austrians  to  strike  at  the 
stream  of  transport  in  the  Mediterranean,  though  it 
could  not  avail  to  save  Montenegro  or  hold  back  the 
Austrians  in  their  advance  into  Albania.  No  fleet 
can  operate  beyond  the  range  of  its  guns,  unless  its 
flying  officers  carry  their  bombs  into  inland  countries. 
The  blockade  maintained  through  the  winter  at  the 
Strait  of  Otranto  was  exceedingly  arduous  and  filled 
with  peril.  Enemy  destroyers  and  submarines  were 
at  work,  issuing  from  the  wonderful  island  fringe  of 
the  Dalmatian  coast,  and  the  French  knew  their 
peril.    The   armoured   cruiser   Leon   Gambetta   was 


32  The  Achievement  of  the  British  Navy- 
sunk  by  submarine  attack,  with  the  loss  of  Rear- 
Admiral  Senes,  who  was  in  command,  and  every 
officer  on  board,  as  well  as  nearly  600  men.  The 
armoured  cruiser  Waldeck-Rousseau  suffered  damage 
by  torpedo,  and  the  new  Dreadnought  Jean  Bart,  with 
Admiral  Boue  de  Lapeyrere,  the  French  Admiralissimo 
of  the  combined  fleets,  on  board,  was  touched,  though 
only  slightly  injured.  There  were  other  submarine 
attacks  and  losses  of  small  craft,  and  some  losses  were 
inflicted  upon  the  enemy.  British  cruisers  were 
attached  to  the  French  Flag  during  these  operations, 
and  they  continued  to  co-operate  with  the  French  and 
Italians  in  Adriatic  waters  and  in  the  ^Egean,  where 
the  French  and  Allied  naval  forces  were  the  guard  of 
all  the  operations  at  Salonika  and  in  the  Piraeus. 
Fleets  and  armies  have  co-operated  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean from  the  very  beginning  of  the  war.  In  May, 
191 7,  the  British  monitors,  which,  with  the  converted 
cruisers,  had  been  operating  with  the  military  expe- 
dition against  the  Turks  and  Bulgarians,  appeared  in 
the  Adriatic,  and  rendered  valuable  aid  to  the  Italians 
in  their  advance  towards  Trieste.  The  naval  coali- 
tion has  been  a  marvel  of  effective  organisation. 

German  professors  have  sometimes  said  that  the 
land  would  sooner  or  later  beat  the  sea — that 
"Moltke"  would  become  the  victor  over  ''Mahan." 
That  is  the  convinced  opinion  of  the  Pan-Germans, 
who  say  that  the  railway  will  yet  prove  the  more 
rapid  and  the  more  secure  means  of  transport  than 
the  steamship.  The  lines  from  Antwerp  by  Cologne 
to  Vienna,  and  from  Hamburg  to  Berlin,  and  thence 
through  the  very  heart  of  Europe  to  Vienna,  and  on 


The  Grasp  of  the  Mediterranean    33 

by  Belgrade  and  Sofia  to  Constantinople,  and  from 
the  opposite  shore  of  the  Bosphorus  to  Baghdad  and 
down  to  the  Gulf,  and  by  a  branch  through  Persia 
to  the  confines  of  India,  were  to  give  commercial  and, 
perchance,  military  command  of  two  continents. 
Enterprise  by  the  branch  railway  through  Aleppo 
and  Damascus  against  Egypt,  with  a  view  to  further 
developments  in  Africa,  was  related  to  this  concep- 
tion of  land-power.  The  measures  adopted  by  the 
Allies  for  the  reconstitution  of  Serbia,  the  expeditions 
to  the  Dardanelles  and  Salonika,  the  strong  action 
taken  in  Greece,  the  naval  movements  on  the  coast 
of  Syria,  the  operations  in  the  Sinai  peninsula  and 
Palestine,  and  the  expedition  from  the  Persian 
Gulf  to  Baghdad  were  the  answer  to  these  gigantesque 
projects  of  the  enemy. 

Behind  them  all  lay  the  working  of  the  fleets. 
Every  class  of  ship  and  almost  every  kind  of  vessel 
employed  in  naval  warfare  has  been  used  in  one  or 
other  of  these  operations — the  battleship,  cruiser, 
destroyer,  torpedo-boat,  submarine,  mother  ship,  aero- 
plane, aircraft-carrier,  mining  vessel,  river  gunboat, 
motor  launch,  mine-trawler,  armed  auxiliary,  special 
service  vessel,  transport,  store  ship,  collier,  oiler,  tank, 
distilling  ship,  ordnance  vessel,  hospital  ship,  tug, 
lighter,  and  a  crowd  of  other  craft.  All  these  are 
required  for  the  work  of  the  Navy  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean, as  elsewhere,  and  they  have  been  employed 
with  a  quality  of  seamanlike  skill,  enterprise, 
resource,  courage,  and  success  such  as  the  history  of 
the  sea  has  no  previous  record  of.  The  appearance 
at  the  Golden  Horn  of  a  British  submarine,  which 


34  The  Achievement  of  the  British  Navy- 
had  traversed  a  Turkish  mine-field,  was  the  sign  of 
new  powers  in  naval  warfare.  We  are  lost  in 
admiration  of  the  self-sacrifice  of  officers  and  men, 
both  of  the  regular  naval  service  and  of  the  mercan- 
tile marine  and  the  fisheries,  the  latter  being  the 
heroes  of  the  perilous  work  of  mine-sweeping.  The 
British  and  French  navies,  and  the  vessel  representing 
the  Russian  Navy,  acted  in  the  closest  co-operation, 
and  all  the  naval  forces  worked  in  intimate  associa- 
tion with  the  armies. 

Where  there  was  failure,  the  failure  was  due  to 
the  inevitable  limitations  of  sea-power,  which  has 
already  been  suggested  with  reference  to  the  North 
German  coast,  Zeebrugge,  and  the  Montenegrin  and 
Albanian  coasts.  The  history  of  the  Dardanelles 
expedition  will  not  be  written  here.  Beginning  with 
a  bombardment  of  the  entrance  forts  on  November 
3rd,  19 14,  which  had  little  other  effect  than  to 
stimulate  the  defence,  continued  after  an  interval 
of  months  by  the  great  naval  attacks  in  March,  19 15, 
in  which  enormous  damage  was  done  to  the  forts  at 
the  entrance  and,  to  some  extent,  at  the  Narrows, 
but  with  the  loss  of  British  and  French  battleships 
by  the  action  of  gunfire  and  drifting  mines,  the 
enterprise  concluded  with  the  landing  of  the  Allied 
armies  in  the  Gallipoli  peninsula.  The  troops  were 
compelled  by  outnumbering  forces  and  concentrated 
gunfire  to  withdraw.  The  combined  attack  should 
have  been  made  at  the  beginning.  The  unaided 
naval  attack  had  merely  stimulated  the  defence. 
Here  was  the  greatest  demonstration  of  which 
there    is    record    of    the    limitation    of  sea-power. 


The  Grasp  of  the  Mediterranean     35 

In  the  attack  of  such  a  military  position  naval  forces 
are  essential,  but  military  operations  are  required  if 
the  desired  success  is  to  be  attained. 

This  is  true  of  all  the  operations  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean and  elsewhere.  Sea-power  gave  the  means 
by  which  the  army  drove  back  the  Turks  from 
Egypt,  and  it  was  the  support  of  the  advance  in 
Sinai  and  Palestine.  It  gave  protection  to  the 
transports  which  carried  troops  and  Army  require- 
ments to  Salonika  and  the  Piraeus,  patrolling  the 
routes  or  providing  convoy  for  the  ships.  The  enemy 
realised  his  opportunity,  and  his  submarines  began 
to  develop  great  activity  in  the  Mediterranean. 
Certain  transports  were  sunk,  and  an  attempt  was 
made  to  cut  the  communications  of  the  expeditionary 
forces  with  their  base.  Some  considerable  losses  were 
suffered  thereby,  but  gradually  systems  were  developed 
which  gave  a  reasonable  sense  of  security.  The 
British,  French,  and  Italian  flotillas  were  employed, 
and  that  of  Japan  came  to  their  aid.  Never  had  such 
naval  co-operation  been  witnessed  before.  We  can- 
not separate  the  advance  in  Mesopotamia  from  the 
Mediterranean  operations  because  the  same  object 
inspired  both — viz.,  that  of  arresting  the  threatened 
development  of  German  commercial  and  military 
power,  through  Asiatic  Turkey  to  the  Persian  Gulf, 
and  through  Persia  to  the  borders  of  India.  The  first 
advance  to  Kut-el-Amara  and  Ctesiphon  proved  dis- 
astrous because  undertaken  with  inadequate  means; 
but  the  Navy  rendered  brilliant  service,  and,  in  the 
second  advance,  a  sufficient  river  flotilla  of  gunboats 
and  transports  made  possible  the  advance  to  Baghdad 


36  The  Achievement  of  the  British  Navy 

and  beyond.  The  naval  flotilla  co-operated  with  most 
excellent  effect  in  this  advance,  played  havoc  with 
enemy's  craft,  and  recaptured  H.M.S.  Firefly,  which 
had  been  lost  in  the  retreat  from  Ctesiphon. 

Thus  we  see  the  Navy  operating  in  the  great 
central  theatre  of  war  and  on  its  outlook  to 
the  East,  exerting  influence,  transporting  troops, 
forming  the  base  of  armies,  and  everywhere  proving 
an  essential  factor  in  all  that  was  done.  It  was  con- 
fronted in  the  Mediterranean,  as  elsewhere,  with  the 
new  weapon  of  the  submarine  in  very  active  form. 
That  menace,  and  the  campaign  against  it,  shall  be 
the  subject  of  the  next  chapter. 


CHAPTER  V 

Dealing  with  the  Submarines 

My   name    is    Captain    Kidd, 

Captain   Kidd. 
My   name    is    Captain    Kidd, 

Captain   Kidd. 
My   name    is    Captain    Kidd, 

And  wickedly  I  did; 
God's  laws  I  did  forbid, 

As  I  sailed. 

Old  Nautical  Ballad. 

HAVING  seen  the  British  Fleet  and  the  fleets 
allied  with  it  operating  in  the  North  Sea, 
the  Oceans,  and  the  Mediterranean,  we  may 
suitably  turn  to  some  special  features  of  the  duties  and 
work  of  the  Navy  in  the  war.  The  submarine  came 
as  a  sign  and  a  portent  of  new  developments  in  the 
means  and  the  practice  of  warfare  at  sea.  Regarded 
once  as  the  weapon  of  the  weaker  Power,  it  was 
adopted  into  the  naval  armoury  of  the  strongest. 
When,  in  1901,  under  Lord  Fisher's  administration 
as  First  Sea  Lord,  a  beginning  was  made  in  subma- 
rine construction  by  the  ordering  of  five  Holland 
boats,  many  people  were  taken  aback.  Confessedly 
the  part  to  be  played  by  the  submarine  lay  at  that 
time  in  the  realm  of  speculation,  but  the  British 
Navy  could  not  afford  to  ignore  it.  Every  advance 
must  be  watched  and  studied  as  it  developed.    The 

37 


38  The  Achievement  of  the  British  Navy 

development  has  been  rapid,  and  there  are  British 
submarines  of  astonishing  powers,  which  have  no 
equals  in  the  world.  They  have  made  their  mark 
in  many  a  theatre  of  war.  The  French  had  led  the 
way.  The  Germans  followed  in  1906.  There  is, 
indeed,  the  best  reason  to  believe  that  Grand  Admiral 
von  Tirpitz,  chief  of  the  Navy  Department,  looked 
with  no  kindly  eye  upon  submarine  boats.  He  was  a 
believer  in  battleships  ,and  the  creator  of  the  High  Sea 
Fleet,  with  its  battle  squadrons  and  cruiser  divisions. 
Concessions  were  made  to  the  Admiralty  Staff,  and  a 
few  submarines  were  put  in  hand ;  but  it  was  not  until 
the  beginning  of  the  war  that  Tirpitz  became  inspired 
with  the  fervour  of  the  convert. 

Even  now  the  relative  position  of  the  submarine 
in  the  category  of  warships  is  obscure.  Admiral 
Sir  Percy  Scott  thought  that  the  knell  of  the  battle- 
ship had  been  rung  by  its  growing  power;  yet  ships 
of  the  battleship  class,  carrying  incredible  armaments, 
possessing  speed  beyond  the  dreams  of  ante-bellum 
naval  constructors,  and  infinitely  superior  for  a  dozen 
reasons  to  anything  the  Germans  had  thought  of,  have 
recently  been  completed,  and  will  probably  play  a 
decisive  part  in  any  future  naval  engagement. 

But  if  the  submarine  has  not  dethroned  the  battle- 
ship, she  has,  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  done  other 
remarkable  things.  She  has  struck  a  mortal  blow 
at  what  many  excellent  people  have  hitherto  regarded 
as  the  settled  and  accepted  code  of  International  Law; 
she  has  appeared  as  a  pirate  commerce-destroyer. 
Without  warning  and  without  pity  she  has  sunk  fish- 
ing vessels,  tramp  steamers,  stately  liners,  and  hospital 


Dealing  with  the  Submarines        39 

ships.  The  code  of  honour  is  not  observed  by  her. 
The  German  submarine  officer  has  orders  to  run  no 
risks,  although  in  the  old  wars  naval  officers — who 
had  no  means  of  submerging  either  to  attack  or  to 
escape — gladly  ran  every  risk  incidental  to  the  service 
in  which  they  were  engaged.  When  the  Lusitania  was 
sunk  it  was  explained  that  if  the  commander  of  the 
submarine  had  permitted  the  passengers  to  take  to  the 
boats  before  firing  his  torpedo,  "this  would  have 
meant  the  certain  destruction  of  his  own  vessel." 
There  was  no  evidence  that  such  would  have  been 
the  case,  but  the  risk,  which  implied  a  danger  merely 
incidental  to  naval  service,  w£is  held  to  justify  the 
sinking  of  the  great  liner  with  1,200  souls  on  board. 
The  wildest  imagination  could  not  have  conceived  that 
any  human  being  could  take  such  a  distorted  view  of 
right  and  wrong,  and  of  the  plain  duty  of  the  seaman. 
The  submarine  has  accomplished  other  remarkable 
things  in  the  war.  She  has  converted  benevolent 
neutrals  into  resolute  enemies.  She  has  brought  the 
United  States  into  the  war  in  support  of  the  Allies. 
She  has  transformed  the  mercantile  marines  opposed 
to  her  into  actual  fighting  forces.  A  few  merchant 
ships  were  armed  before  the  war  began,  but  now, 
because  of  ruthless  submarine  attack,  the  British  mer- 
cantile marine  is  for  practical  purposes  embodied  with 
the  Navy,  in  the  sense  that  it  is  under  naval  control, 
is  provided  with  means  of  defence,  and  acts  directly 
under  iiaval  orders.  Moreover,  one-half  or  more  of 
its  shipping  has  been  taken  over  by  the  naval  service. 
The  same  is  true  of  the  merchant  ships  of  the  Allies. 
The  German  submarine  has  had  a  further  effect.    She 


40  The  Achievement  of  the  British  Navy 

has  created  a  whole  array  of  means  directed  to  her 
destruction.  Countless  inventors  have  been  set  at 
work,  and  extraordinarily  ingenious  methods  have 
been  employed  with  the  purpose  of  putting  an  end 
to  submarine  activities  by  sinking  every  boat  as  she 
appeared. 

In  the  early  days  of  the  submarine  it  was  believed 
that  she  might  be  sunk  by  using  spar  torpedoes 
fixed  in  swift  boats,  which  would  bear  down  upon  the 
submarine  as  she  submerged  and  explode  the  charge 
against  her  hull.  But  it  soon  occurred  to  seamen 
that  if  a  swift  vessel,  destroyer  or  other,  could  run 
down  a  submarine  she  might  more  easily  sink  her  by 
the  impact  of  her  sharp  stem  or  a  special  keel.  This 
method  has  been  practised  in  the  war,  and  by  this 
means  a  number  of  enemy  submarines  have  been  dis- 
patched to  Davy  Jones's  locker.  There  was  an  early 
case  in  which  a  certain  destroyer,  going  at  high  speed, 
actually  impaled  a  German  submarine  on  her  stem, 
and  carried  her  onward,  so  injured  that  she  sank. 
Another  early  case  was  that  of  the  German  submarine 
rammed  and  sent  to  the  bottom  off  Beachy  Head  on 
March  28th,  191 5,  by  the  Thordis,  commanded  by 
that  plucky  skipper.  Captain  Bell,  who  set  an  example 
to  many. 

Another  plan  was  to  use  suitable  vessels  in  pairs, 
each  pair  dragging  a  cable  connecting  them,  from 
which  hung,  on  short  lines,  small  mines  to  be  elec- 
trically exploded  when  a  submerged  obstruction, 
probably  a  periscope  or  conning-tower,  put  a  tension 
upon  the  connecting  cable.  The  disadvantage  of 
this  system  was  that  the  entrapping  vessels  could  not 


Dealing  with  the  Submarines        41 

travel  swiftly  without  bringing  the  cable  near  to  the 
surface,  and  the  chance  of  a  submarine  fouling  the 
cable  was  remote.  Yet  it  may  be  conjectured  that 
the  features  of  this  system  may  have  furnished  the 
germ  of  procedures  now  in  use.  Capture  or  sinking 
by  the  use  of  nets  was  also  an  early  idea,  probably 
suggested  by  the  nets  used  by  big  ships  at  anchor  for 
protection  against  torpedoes,  and  Admiral  Sir  Arthur 
Wilson  devised  a  large  steel  net  for  the  purpose.  Pos- 
sibly this  method,  too,  has  developed  into  the  nets 
employed  in  dealing  with  enemy  submarines  at  the 
present  time.  But  submarines  were  continually 
increasing  in  strength  of  structure,  speed,  and  handi- 
ness,  so  that  new  systems  were  necessary  and  have 
developed  with  the  requirements. 

What  the  actual  methods  employed  by  the  Navy 
are  cannot  be  explained.  When  Mr.  Frederick 
Palmer,  the  American  writer,  visited  the  Grand  Fleet 
he  asked  how  the  thing  was  done,  and  officers  said: 
"Sometimes  by  ramming;  sometimes  by  gunfire; 
sometimes  by  explosives;  and  in  many  other  ways 
which  we  do  not  tell."  M.  Joseph  Reinach  also 
visited  the  Fleet,  and  said  in  the  Figaro  that  the 
submarine  was  pursued  "by  net,  gun,  explosive  bomb, 
and  other  means."  Squadron-Commander  Bigsworth 
on  August  26th,  191 5,  destroyed  a  submarine  off 
Ostend  by  dropping  bombs  upon  her  from  his  aero- 
plane, and  there  have  been  several  other  episodes  of 
the  same  kind.  When  the  first  American  transports 
were  attacked  in  the  Atlantic,  bombs  fitted  with  a 
short-time  fuse  were  employed  which  burst  at  a 
determined  depth  below  the  surface  of  the  sea. 


42  The  Achievement  of  the  British  Navy 

The  Royal  Naval  Air  Service  plays  a  large  part  in 
the  anti-submarine  campaign.  Its  seaplanes  are  always 
scouting  over  our  waters  and  sight  enemy  submarines 
from  afar.  Flying  high,  they  can  and  do  discover 
submarines  navigating  below  the  surface,  and  by 
wireless  or  other  signals  bring  destroyers  or  other 
craft  to  the  scene,  where  by  special  means  submarines 
are  destroyed. 

Probably  gunfire  is  the  chief  means  by  which  sub- 
marines are  sent  to  the  bottom.  A  German  submarine 
may  attain  complete  submergence  from  the  cruising 
trim  within  about  three  minutes ;  but  the  time  may  be 
longer,  if  she  has  a  gun  mounted,  wireless  rigged,  and 
other  top  hamper.  From  the  awash  position,  in  which 
her  speed  is  reduced,  she  may  submerge  in  about  two 
minutes.  A  swift  destroyer,  knowing  the  position  of 
such  a  submarine,  may  advance  toward  her,  covering 
a  nautical  mile  within  two  minutes,  so  that  she  has  an 
excellent  chance  of  coming  within  range  and  putting  in 
shots  with  effect.  Gunnery  is  carried  to  a  high  pitch 
of  proficiency  in  the  Navy,  and  one  destroyer  may  be 
mentioned  which  knocked  out  the  periscope  of  a 
German  submarine  at  a  range  of  over  2,000  yards 
with  her  first  round.  There  is  nothing  an  enemy  sub- 
marine likes  less  than  to  see  destroyers  tearing  down 
towards  her  at  high  speed  as  she  is  getting  in  her  gun, 
withdrawing  her  periscope,  lowering  her  masts — often 
a  disguise — and  filling  her  tanks.  Moreover,  com- 
plete submergence  may  not  be  a  sure  protection  for 
her  if  she  is  watched,  for  she  may  be  destroyed  by  an 
explosive  bomb. 

German    submarines   have    also   learned    to    fear 


Dealing  with  the  Submarines        43 

armed  merchantmen,  which  have  not  seldom  used 
their  guns  with  effect,  sometimes  compelling  their 
assailants  to  submerge,  and  so  evading  their  attack, 
and  sometimes  by  obtaining  direct  hits.  The 
Dunrohin  in  September,  191 6,  carried  on  a  lively 
action  for  some  minutes,  hitting  her  assailant  in  the 
vicinity  of  her  conning-tower  with  a  T.N.T.  shell — 
thereby  causing  an  internal  explosion,  from  which 
dense  smoke  arose — followed  by  three  common  shell, 
each  of  them  making  a  direct  hit,  after  which  the 
enemy  suddenly  plunged  at  a  sharp  angle,  evidently 
going  to  the  bottom.  In  March,  19 17,  the  Bellorado 
was  attacked  by  gunfire  from  a  submarine,  whereby 
her  master,  chief  officer,  and  a  seaman  were  killed, 
while  her  gunners  put  such  shot  into  the  assailant  that 
she  was  silenced  and  manifestly  disabled. 

Further  it  is  not  permissible  to  go  on  describing  how 
submarines  are  accounted  for.  The  catalogue  of 
methods  is  a  long  one.  There  could  certainly  be  no 
single  and  decisive  weapon  for  the  destruction  of  this 
new  engine  of  warfare.  There  is  no  remedy  for  the 
effects  of  gunfire,  and  if  submarines  discover  targets 
possible  to  be  attacked  they  will  certainly  attack  them. 
Some  surprise  was  expressed  that  the  British  Admir- 
alty did  not  at  once  suppress  the  submarine  menace. 
When  the  submarine  campaign  began  in  February, 
191 5,  it  resulted  in  the  sinking  of  a  number  of  British 
merchantmen;  but,  having  risen  to  its  height,  it 
declined,  with  fluctuations,  until  it  was  described  as 
being  "well  in  hand."  The  methods  employed  had 
been  successful.  Then,  after  several  months,  the 
submarines  began  their  depredations  again,  carrying 


44  The  Achievement  of  the  British  Navy 

them  into  the  Atlantic  and  the  Mediterranean  with 
great  violence.  They  also  penetrated  the  Channel, 
though  they  never  checked  the  great  stream  of  trans- 
port for  the  armies  between  English  and  French  ports, 
which  the  Navy  was  guarding  with  complete  success. 

The  reason  for  this  recrudescence  of  submarine 
piracy  was  the  intense  energy  which  the  Germans 
devoted  to  the  production  of  standardised  and 
powerful  classes  of  submarines,  whose  parts  were 
produced  in  many  districts  of  the  German  Empire. 
The  new  boats  were  practically  submarine  cruisers, 
capable  of  high  surface  speed,  which  enabled  them  to 
overhaul  slow  merchantmen,  and  they  were  armed 
with  powerful  guns.  The  early  enemy  submarine 
carried  a  1.4-inch  gun,  but  a  2.9-inch  12-pounder 
was  provided.  There  is  now  reason  to  believe  that 
the  calibre  has  risen  to  4.1  inches  and,  in  the  case 
of  some  of  the  more  powerful  boats,  to  5.1  inches, 
these  larger  guns  being  shorter  and  lighter  than  the 
same  guns  mounted  in  cruisers.  But  obviously  sub- 
marines of  these  classes,  carrying  on  their  work  over 
wider  areas  and  in  distant  places,  will  not  be  so  easy 
to  destroy  as  the  smaller  boats  of  the  early  submarine 
campaign,  and  this  may  account  for  the  difficulty  in 
providing  a  complete  protection  from  the  attack.  Sub- 
marine sections  have  been  sent  overland  and  assem- 
bled at  Trieste  for  the  Adriatic  and  Mediterranean, 
and  at  Varna  for  use  in  the  Black  Sea,  and  also  doubt- 
less at  the  Golden  Horn  or  in  the  Gulf  of  Ismid. 

There  is  much  uncertainty  about  the  future  of  the 
submarine.  She  exercises  no  command  at  sea,  and 
she  makes  many  fruitless  attacks  upon  armed  mer- 


Dealing  with  the  Submarines        45 

chantmen;  but  she  is  dangerous,  nevertheless.  The 
British  Navy  has  devoted  exhaustless  energy  in  apply- 
ing every  possible  agency  for  dealing  with  hostile  sub- 
marines, and  its  great  success  encourages  the  hope  and 
belief  that  the  scourge  will  yet  be  exterminated.  De- 
stroyers, motor  launches,  patrolling  ships  of  many 
classes,  seaplanes,  observation  balloons,  and  other 
craft  are  at  work  every  day  and  many  of  them  every 
night.  But  whatever  element  of  uncertainty  there 
may  be  as  to  the  complete  success  of  these  agencies, 
there  is  none  in  the  conclusion  that  the  submarine 
will  never  bring  England,  still  less  her  Allies,  to  the 
verge  of  famine  or  anywhere  near  it.  Scarcity  of  food 
is  not  due  so  much  to  the  submarine  as  to  the  great 
demand  on  the  world's  supplies,  and  the  enormous 
volume  of  shipping  absorbed  by  the  naval  and  mili- 
tary requirements  of  England  and  her  Allies.  The 
Navy,  which  has  done  such  wonderful  work  in  the 
war,  is  not  and  will  not  be  ineffective  against  the  sub- 
marine. 


CHAPTER  VI 
The  Navy  and  the  Mine 

They  sink,  they  slink,  they  seek  the  boat, 

Grisly  horns  stuck  through  their  skin, 
Ready  to  sink  all  things  that  float. 

These  villain  boxes  shaped  of  tin. 

The  fisher  sees  the  death  therein. 
But  reaches  down  with  his  long  fling. 

And  grasps  the  chain  that  holds  them  in. 
And  draws  the  fangs  they  hoped  would  sting. 

Anon. 

THE  British  Navy  fights  for  the  great  ideals 
of  the  people,  acting  upon  the  lines  of  old 
and  loyal  traditions;  but,  while  doing  so,  it 
has  encountered  the  desperate  devices  of  the  enemy, 
who  has  used  the  latest  achievements  of  scientific 
and  mechanical  invention  in  such  a  manner  as  to 
overthrow  many  preconceived  methods  and  accepted 
conventions  of  naval  warfare.  We  have  already 
spoken  of  the  submarine.  Now  we  shall  see  what 
the  mine  is,  and  how  it  is  dealt  with  by  the  Navy 
and  the  services  the  Navy  controls.  It  has  been 
said,  with  much  truth,  that  the  essence  of  war  is 
violence  and  that  moderation  in  war  is  futility.  It 
is  also  true,  as  we  see,  in  the  cruel  operations  of 
Zeppelins  and  bomb-dropping  aeroplanes,  and  not 
less  in  the  attacks  of  submarines,  as  directed  by  the 
Germans  and  their  allies,  that  the  non-military  popu- 

46 


The  Navy  and  the  Mine  47 

lations  suffer  the  horrors  of  war  in  much  greater  degree 
than  was  the  case  in  the  wars  even  of  recent  times. 

But  the  Germans,  at  the  very  beginning  of  the 
war,  outraged  neutral  sentiment  by  employing  osten- 
sible merchant  and  passenger  vessels,  flying  neutral 
flags,  and  without  giving  warning  to  the  neutrals,  in 
the  deadly  work  of  scattering  mines  indiscriminately 
in  the  open  sea  on  the  main  lines  of  trade.  They 
acted  in  direct  contravention  of  the  rules  of  war  as 
previously  accepted.  These  disguised  mining  vessels 
had  traversed  the  trade  routes  as  if  pursuing  peaceful 
purposes,  thus  enjoying  the  immunities  which  had 
always  been  accorded  to  innocent  neutral  vessels,  and 
yet  they  had  wantonly  endangered  the  lives  of  all 
who  traversed  the  sea,  whether  neutral  or  enemy. 
The  Admiralty  were  soon  able  to  declare  publicly  that 
this  mine-laying  under  a  neutral  flag,  as  well  as  recon- 
naissance conducted  by  trawlers  and  even  by  hospital 
ships  and  neutral  vessels,  had  become  the  ordinary 
methods  of  German  naval  warfare.  The  later  history 
of  the  war  shows  how  far  the  Germans  were  prepared 
to  go  in  casting  off  any  restraint  in  their  efforts  to 
do  injury  to  their  enemies.  They  compelled  the 
British  Admiralty  to  adopt  counter-measures. 

For  years  past  the  Germans  had  devoted  unremit- 
ting attention  to  the  study  and  practice  of  mining 
and  the  production  of  very  powerful  types  of  mines. 
In  that  respect  they  were  undoubtedly  ready.  The 
state  of  war  between  England  and  Germany  began 
at  II  p.m.  on  August  4th,  19 14,  and  on  the  morning 
of  the  next  day  German  mines  were  being  laid  on 
the  east  coast  of  England.     The  Konigin  Luise,  a 


48  The  Achievement  of  the  British  Navy 

former  Hamburg- Amerika  liner  of  2,163  tons,  was 
caught  in  the  act,  off  the  Suffolk  coast,  and  was  sunk 
by  the  light  cruiser  Amphion  and  the  Third  Torpedo 
Flotilla.  On  the  next  day  the  Amphion  herself,  the 
first  British  warship  destroyed  in  the  war,  fell  a 
victim  to  the  mines  she  had  laid.  This  disguised 
mine-layer  had  initiated  a  practice,  which  has  since 
been  many  times  followed  in  the  war,  of  throwing 
mines  overboard  in  the  track  of  pursuing  vessels. 
It  was  resorted  to  by  the  retreating  Germans  in  the 
battle  of  the  Dogger  Bank.  Here  it  may  be  remarked 
that  the  Germans  have  always  claimed  the  right  to 
subject  every  consideration  to  their  necessity  to  win, 
though  at  The  Hague  Conference  of  1907,  Baron 
Marschall  von  Bieberstein,  the  German  delegate,  said 
that  conscience,  good  sense,  and  the  duty  imposed 
by  the  principles  of  humanity  would  constitute  the 
most  effective  guarantee  against  abuse,  and  he  pro- 
claimed— "je  le  dis  d,  haute  voix" — that  German  naval 
officers  would  always  fulfil  "in  the  strictest  fashion 
the  duties  which  emanate  from  the  unwritten  law  of 
humanity  and  civilisation." 

Any  technical  description  of  German  mines  would 
be  out  of  place  here;  but  it  may  be  said  that  generally 
they  approximate  to  a  spherical  shape,  and  are  pro- 
vided with  projecting  "horns,"  almost  in  the  shape  of 
drumsticks,  concussion  with  which  is  calculated  to 
break  a  small  phial  within,  whose  contents  cause 
the  detonation  of  the  enormous  charge  of  T.N.T.  ex- 
plosive. Each  mine  is  provided  with  a  sinker,  which 
drops  to  the  bottom,  and  is  attached  to  the  mine  by 
a  cable  or  sounding-line  paid  out  by  special  mech- 


The  Navy  and  the  Mine  49 

anism  to  any  desired  length,  whereby  the  mine  may 
be  kept  at  the  intended  depth  below  the  surface. 
There  are  other  types  of  mines,  and  in  particular  one 
of  cylindrical  form,  containing  a  prodigious  quantity 
of  explosive  and  capable  of  the  widest  destruction. 
This  has  probably  been  used  only  in  special  situations. 
The  ordinary  mines  can  be  laid  with  great  rapidity  by 
a  specially  fitted  mine-layer,  provided  with  rotary  gear, 
bringing  mine  after  mine  along  a  special  track  to  the 
dropping  position.  The  drifting  mines  which  the 
Germans  at  the  very  beginning  of  the  war  set  afloat 
in  the  main  trade  route  from  America  to  Liverpool, 
via  the  North  of  Ireland,  can  be  laid  with  still  greater 
rapidity. 

When  mine-laying  in  British  waters  by  surface 
boats  was  made  extremely  risky,  or  almost  impos- 
sible, the  Germans  resorted  to  the  employment  of 
submarine  mine-layers,  one  of  which  was  exhibited 
in  the  Thames.  Vessels  of  this  class,  so  far  as  they 
are  known,  probably  carry  a  maximum  of  twelve 
big  mines  in  six  shoots  or  air-locks,  the  lower  mine 
in  each  shoot  being  released  by  means  of  a  lever, 
after  which  the  other  drops  into  its  place,  ready  to 
be  let  go  in  the  same  way.  The  boat  exhibited  in 
London  and  elsewhere  was  of  a  rough,  rudimentary 
character,  indifferently  built,  and  her  speed  was  prob- 
ably not  more  than  six  or  eight  knots.  Undoubtedly 
many  of  the  submarine  mine-layers  are  of  better  type. 
They  are  constantly  at  work  especially  on  the  east 
coast  of  England,  and  some  losses  have  resulted;  but 
the  effect  of  their  operations  is  nearly  always  over- 
come by  the  means  adopted  by  the  Navy. 


50  The  Achievement  of  the  British  Navy 

The  first  measure  set  on  foot  by  the  Admiralty 
was  to  organise  a  system  of  search  for  suspicious 
craft,  and  to  declare  the  North  Sea  a  war  area, 
within  which  it  was  dangerous  for  any  vessel  to 
navigate  except  through  channels  indicated  by  the 
naval  authorities.  The  Germans  replied  with  their 
now  famous  and  futile  blockade  order  of  February, 
191 5.  New  regulations  were  issued  from  time  to 
time  regulating  navigation  through  the  British  mine- 
fields, and  the  result  has  been,  in  association  with  the 
patrols,  to  exercise  a  very  close  supervision  over  the 
navigation  in  home  waters.  As  to  distant  mining 
operations  of  the  enemy,  the  First  Lord  of  the  Ad- 
miralty stated,  on  March  8th,  191 7,  that  they  had 
been  carried  very  far,  and  the  P.  &  O.  liner  Mongolia, 
sunk  off  Bombay  on  June  23rd,  191 7,  was  not  the  only 
vessel  mined  in  the  Arabian  Sea.  From  time  to  time 
it  has  been  announced  that  mails  for  and  from  the 
East  and  Australia  have  been  lost  at  sea. 

It  is  an  inspiring  thing  to  turn  from  this  picture 
of  mines  and  the  scattering  of  them  by  the  enemy 
to  another  picture — that  of  the  gallant  and  successful 
manner  in  which  the  Navy,  and  the  mine-trawlers 
and  other  vessels  embodied  in  its  service  and  em- 
ployed in  the  ceaseless  patrols,  have  grappled  with" 
the  deadly  ipenace  of  the  mine.  Ever  patrolling  the 
British  coasts,  ever  facing  death,  often  speeding  to 
the  help  of  vessels  mined,  torpedoed,  or  otherwise  in 
distress,  the  glorious  men  who  man  these  craft  have 
inscribed  their  names  in  letters  of  gold  on  the  roll  of 
British  honour  and  fame  at  sea.  It  was  a  marvellous 
thing,  this  embodiment  of  the  vast  mine-sweeping  and 


The  Navy  and  the  Mine  51 

patrolling  service  in  the  work  of  the  Navy  in  the  war. 
From  all  the  coasts  fishermen  have  come,  with  their 
trawlers  converted  from  the  craft  of  winning  fish  at 
sea,  to  the  sterner  work  of  bringing  up  and  destroying 
the  strange  harvest  of  deadly  mines  which  endanger 
all  life  at  sea.  Many  a  trawler  has  been  sunk  by 
contact  with  her  fatal  captures;  others  have  been 
sunk  by  hostile  fire  and  bombing  by  enemy  aeroplanes, 
but  never  have  the  brave  seamen  quailed  in  the  serv- 
ice of  the  country  and  the  Allies,  and  in  every  port 
men  are  to  be  met  whose  craft  have  been  sunk  under 
them,  and  who  have  hastened  to  sea  again. 

Hundreds  of  ships,  drawn  from  the  mercantile 
marine  and  the  fisheries,  steam  yachts,  motor  boats, 
armed  launches,  and  vessels  of  other  classes,  are 
employed  in  such  dangerous  work.  They  share  the 
trials  of  war,  wind,  and  weather  with  the  regular 
naval  patrols.  Sir  Edward  Carson,  when  First  Lord  of 
the  Admiralty,  directed  attention  to  the  magnificent 
work  of  the  mine-trawlers  of  these  patrols.  The 
force  employed  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  numbered 
about  150  small  vessels,  but  increased  to  3,000  or 
more.  The  whole  nation  should  understand  what 
mine-sweepers  were  doing.  "The  thousands  of  men 
engaged  in  this  operation  are  the  men  who  are 
feeding  the  whole  population  of  this  country,  from 
morning  till  night,  battling  with  the  elements  as 
well  as  the  enemy,  facing  dangers  under  the  sea.  A 
mine-sweeper  carries  his  life  in  his  hands  at  every 
moment,  and  he  does  it  willingly."  Later  again  he 
expressed  his  thanks  and  the  thanks  of  the  nation 
for  the  splendid  work  they  had  accomplished.     Of 


52  The  Achievement  of  the  British  Navy- 
all  the  seamen  who  had  so  deservedly  earned  the 
gratitude  of  the  country  none  had  had  more  arduous 
and  dangerous  duties  to  perform  than  the  gallant 
fellows  in  the  patrols. 

They  have  worked  in  reliefs  day  and  night  at  sea, 
though  sometimes  driven  to  port  by  the  fury  of  the 
elements,  and  they  brave  every  kind  of  weather.  As 
Admiral  Bacon,  commanding  the  Dover  Patrol,  has 
said,  with  reference  to  the  security  with  which  thou- 
sands of  merchantmen  had  passed  through  the  waters 
in  his  control,  ''no  figures  could  emphasise  more 
thoroughly  the  sacrifice  made  by  the  personnel  of 
the  patrols  and  the  relative  immunity  ensured  to  the 
commerce  of  their  country."  They  have  trawled  for 
mines  not  only  in  British  but  in  distant  waters.  Their 
magnificent  work  under  fire,  and  attacked  by  bomb- 
dropping  aeroplanes,  at  the  Dardanelles  will  never 
be  forgotten. 

An  American  correspondent,  Mr.  Gordon  Bruce, 
who  sailed  in  a  mine-trawler  to  learn  its  work,  con- 
cluded an  article  in  the  New  York  Tribune  in  these 
words: — 

I  looked  at  those  men  who  go  out  day  after  day; 
who  wear  their  lifebelts  continuously;  who  take 
their  tea  on  the  decks  while  they  peer  over  the  rims 
of  their  cups  for  the  death  that  lurks  in  those  som- 
bre waters.  I  thought  how  fine  v/as  their  devotion 
to  their  duty;  how  great  a  part  they  are  playing  in 
the  war — out  there  alone,  where  their  deeds  are 
attended  with  no  sounding  of  trumpets,  where  they 
give  to  their  work  the  same  quality  of  bravery  as  is 
required  of  the  man  in  the  trenches.  And  as  I 
glanced  at  the  inscription  over  the  cabin,  which  read 


The  Navy  and  the  Mine  53 

"England  expects  every  man  to  do  his  duty,"  I  knew 
that  England  would  not  be  disappointed. 

The  practical  methods  by  which  the  Navy  and  its 
brave  mine-trawlers  conduct  their  operations  are  of 
great  interest,  but  description  cannot  go  too  far. 
The  enemy  is  certainly  well  acquainted  with  all 
British  methods  previous  to  the  war;  but  mine-sweep- 
ing systems  do  not  stand  still,  but  develop  with  the 
progress  of  armaments  generally.  Mine-trawling  is 
developed  from  the  system  of  trawling  for  fish,  which 
before  the  war  had  reached  a  high  degree  of  technical 
efficiency,  and  in  the  application  of  that  system  to 
their  work  in  the  war  the  men  have  attained  great 
proficiency  and  become  extraordinarily  successful. 
The  trawl-net  varies  in  size  with  the  dimensions  of 
the  vessel  using  it.  An  average  size  would  be  about 
100  feet  in  length,  with  a  spread  of  from  80  to  90 
feet.  The  principal  features  in  fishing  trawlers  are 
fore  and  after  frameworks,  with  fairleaders,  a  towing- 
block,  a  powerful  steam-winch,  and  towing-warps.  A 
trawler  would  pay  out  hundreds  of  fathoms  of  heavy 
wire  warp,  the  handling  of  which  called  for  great 
skill  and  dexterity.  It  was  not  a  very  difficult  thing 
to  adapt  this  method  of  trawling  to  the  sweeping  for 
mines.  The  fishing  trawler  goes  unaided,  but  in  mine- 
sweeping  the  trawlers  work  in  pairs,  and  the  towing- 
warp  is  replaced  by  the  sweeping-wire.  Two  trawlers, 
steaming  abreast  at  a  certain  interval,  drag  a  weighted 
steel  hawser  which,  upon  striking  the  mooring  of  a 
mine,  brings  the  deadly  catch  to  the  surface,  where 
it  is  exploded  by  gunfire  from  a  destroyer  or  by  rifle 
fire  from  an  armed  trawler  or  motor  boat.    The  mine- 


54  The  Achievement  of  the  British  Navy- 
sweepers  have  encountered  perils  and  hardships  which 
have  never  been  recorded,  and  fishing  trawlers  pursu- 
ing their  peaceful  occupations  have  often  incurred 
the  same  risks. 

Next  after  the  destruction  of  the  enemy's  fighting 
vessels  comes  the  destruction  of  his  death-dealing 
mines,  and  the  mine- trawlers,  confronted  with  an  un- 
paralleled task,  attended  with  extreme  peril,  have  ren- 
dered magnificent  service  to  England  and  her  Allies. 


CHAPTER  VII 
The  Navy  and  Army  Transport 

What  of  the  mark? 

Ah !  seek  it  not  in  England ; 
A  bold  mark,  an  old  mark 

Is  waiting  over-sea; 
Where  the  string  harps  in  chorus, 
And  the  lion  flag  is  o'er  us, 

It  is  there  our  work  shall  be. 

Sir  A.  Co  nan  Doyle. 

THE  stupendous  and  scarcely  calculable  opera- 
tion  of  transporting  by  sea  the  enormous 
armies  which  are  employed  in  many  theatres 
of  the  hostilities  is  the  index  and  measure  of  the 
greatest  of  all  the  triumphs  of  naval  power  in  the 
war,  namely,  that  of  establishing  and  maintaining 
essential  command  of  the  sea.  Against  this  bulwark 
the  enemy's  naval  forces  have  battled  in  vain.  The 
submarine  may,  in  some  degree  and  in  some  circum- 
stances, affect  command  of  the  sea,  but  it  cannot 
exercise  it. 

It  is  difficult  to  realise  all  that  the  transport  of 
millions  of  men,  organised  as  armies  and  provided 
with  all  that  armies  require,  has  meant  to  the  Allies, 
or  to  bring  home  to  ourselves  a  full  sense  of  what 
the  responsibilities  of  the  Navy  have  been  in  safe- 
guarding them.  The  armies  of  Frederick  and  Napo- 
leon were  pygmies  compared  with  the  vast  hosts  which 

55 


5Q  The  Achievement  of  the  British  Navy 

are  set  in  the  field  to-day.  When  Frederick  invaded 
Silesia  he  had  with  him  not  more  than  30,000  men. 
The  motley  army  with  which  Napoleon  invaded  Rus- 
sia— the  greatest  that  had  ever  been  brought  under  a 
single  command — did  not  greatly  exceed  600,000  on 
a  liberal  computation.  Wellington  in  the  Peninsula 
never  commanded  50,000  men.  But  in  March,  191 6, 
Mr.  Balfour,  then  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty,  said 
that  4,000,000  combatants  had  already  been  trans- 
ported under  the  guardianship  of  the  British  "Fleet, 
with  1,000,000  horses  and  other  animals,  2,500,000 
tons  of  stores,  and  22,000,000  gallons  of  oil,  for  British 
use  and  the  use  of  the  Allies.  In  January,  191 7, 
Admiral  Sir  John  Jellicoe,  First  Sea  Lord,  said  that 
over  7,000,000  men  had  been  transported,  together 
with  all  the  guns,  munitions,  and  stores  they  required. 
Six  months  later,  when  the  United  States  troops  began 
to  arrive,  the  figure  may  be  estimated  to  have  reached 
10,000,000. 

The  victory  of  Germany  would  have  been  swift 
and  decisive  if  the  great  armies  represented  by  these 
figures  had  not  come  to  the  support  of  France.  French 
troops  from  Northern  Africa  and  the  East  also  joined 
her  brave  army,  because  transport  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean was  secure.  The  great  army  of  Russia  could 
have  made  no  offensive  movement  if  she  had  not 
received  the  immense  supplies  of  guns,  munitions, 
motors,  and  other  material  which  came  to  her  from 
abroad.  Because  of  British  supremacy  at  sea  and  the 
shipping  that  consequently  came  there.  Archangel, 
from  being  a  sleepy  harbour,  developed  into  one  of 
the  busiest  ports  on  the  continent  of  Europe.    Italy 


The  Navy  and  Army  Transport     57 

could  have  made  no  headway  if  many  of  the  things 
she  required  had  not  come  to  her  by  sea.  Greece 
would  have  remained  permanently  on  the  side  of  the 
enemy  if  sea-power  and  the  troops  transported  there 
had  not  rallied  her  to  the  Allies.  The  German  col- 
onies would  not  have  been  occupied  if  fleets  had  not 
carried  to  them  the  troops  for  their  subjection.  Eng- 
land, by  virtue  of  sea  command  guaranteed  by  her 
Fleet,  has  gathered  her  armies  from  India,  Canada, 
Australia,  New  Zealand,  and  from  every  colony  and 
possession,  and  has  sent  them  to  serve  in  France,  Bel- 
gium, Greece,  Gallipoli,  Egypt,  Palestine,  Macedonia, 
Mesopotamia,  and  Africa.  Not  a  soldier  has  gone 
afloat  but  a  seaman  has  carried  him  on  his  back. 

Before  we  can  appreciate  this  aspect  of  the  work 
of  the  Navy  in  the  war,  we  must  gain  some  idea  of 
what  is  implied  by  the  military  service  of  these  armies 
in  the  field.  It  is  not  enough  to  dispatch  armies. 
They  must  be  maintained  and  supplied.  The  com- 
munications of  an  army  are  vital  to  its  operations, 
and  the  communications  of  all  the  armies  that  England 
is  employing  are  by  sea,  and  are  guarded  by  the  Navy. 
It  would  not  be  an  easy  thing  to  estimate  the  vast 
requirements  of  fighting  forces;  but  that  is  unneces- 
sary. They  are  on  an  infinitely  greater  scale,  in  pro- 
portion to  the  strength  of  the  troops  employed,  than 
in  any  previous  war.  Guns  are  far  more  numerous 
and  much  heavier  than  they  were.  The  expenditure 
of  ammunition  has  gone  beyond  all  anticipation,  and 
a  real  fleet  is  required  for  its  transport.  Horses,  mules, 
many  descriptions  of  heavy  and  light  ordnance  and 
ammunition  for  them,  warlike  and  general  stores  of 


58  The  Achievement  of  the  British  Navy 

innumerable  kinds,  aeroplanes,  balloons,  the  gigantic 
''tanks,"  hospitals  and  hospital  requisites,  clothing, 
food,  forage,  camp  equipment,  transport  vehicles,  trac- 
tion engines,  pontooning,  railway,  telegraph,  building, 
and  mining  material,  locomotives  of  many  kinds,  pe- 
trol, and  a  hundred  other  stores  and  things  are  neces- 
sary, and  they  must  day  and  night  be  in  transit,  with- 
out rest  or  pause.  It  will  illustrate  the  gigantic  nature 
of  the  operation  if  we  record  that  between  November, 
1916,  and  June,  1917,  2,000  miles  of  complete  railway 
track  were  shipped,  with  nearly  1,000  locomotives, 
and  other  supplies  by  railway  companies.  Labour 
and  work  for  a  hundred  different  services  have  to  be 
provided  also.  The  United  States  and  other  countries 
have  contributed  enormous  supplies,  and,  with  the 
coming  of  the  American  Army,  the  volume  of  the 
ceaseless  torrent — the  veritable  Niagara — will  increase 
still  more.  History  has  no  parallel  for  such  opera- 
tions. 

This  vast  business  being  the  charge  of  the  British 
Navy  and  of  the  navies  allied  with  it,  we  see  how 
great  an  object  it  must  be  of  the  enemy  to  strike  at 
the  lines  of  supply.  That  they  have  completely 
failed  would  appear  almost  miraculous,  if  we  did  not 
know  that  the  reasons  for  the  failure  are  altogether 
of  a  practical  character.  It  was  inevitable  that  there 
should  be  some  losses  when  submarines  and  mine- 
layers were  at  work,  but  the  destruction  effected 
has  been  a  mere  fraction  of  the  whole,  and  the  influ- 
ence upon  the  campaigns  is  entirely  negligible.  The 
Ministry  of  Munitions  imports  1,500,000  tons  of  ma- 
terial every  month.    The  most  considerable  loss  due 


The  Navy  and  Army  Transport     59 

to  attack  has  been  in  the  matter  of  shell  components, 
but  it  did  not  amount  to  more  than  5.9  per  cent,  of 
the  whole  supply  from  the  beginning  of  the  submarine 
campaign  up  to  June,  19 17.  The  most  serious  disas- 
ters were  in  the  Mediterranean,  where  submarines 
sank  the  French  transports  Provence  II.  and  Gallia, 
engaged  in  the  Salonika  expedition,  with  the  loss  of 
about  1,600  lives.  The  enemy  will  certainly  continue 
his  efforts. 

Never  was  a  more  seriously  planned  attempt  made 
than  that  of  June  22nd,  19 17,  when  General  Pershing's 
American  Expeditionary  Force  was  crossing  the  At- 
lantic. German  submarines,  in  considerable  force, 
made  two  attacks  upon  the  transports,  and  on  both 
occasions  were  beaten  off  with  every  appearance  of 
loss.  One  submarine  was  certainly  sunk,  and  there 
was  reason  to  believe  that  the  accurate  fire  of  the 
American  gunners  sent  others  to  the  bottom.  For 
purposes  of  convenience  the  expedition  had  been  di- 
vided into  contingents,  each  composed  of  troop-ships 
and  a  naval  escort  designed  to  keep  off  such  raiders 
as  might  be  met  with.  An  ocean  rendezvous  was 
arranged  with  the  American  destroyers  then  operating 
in  European  waters,  in  order  that  the  passage  through 
the  danger  zone  might  be  attended  by  every  possible 
protection.  There  was  reason  to  believe  that  the  Ger- 
mans had  secret  intelligence  of  the  course  taken  by  the 
transports  to  the  rendezvous  and  of  the  time  appointed 
for  their  arrival  there. 

The  first  attack  occurred  at  10.30  p.m.  at  a  point 
well  on  the  American  side  of  the  rendezvous,  in  a 
part  of  the  Atlantic  which  might  have  been  presumed 


60  The  Achievement  of  the  British  Navy- 
free  from  submarines.  The  heavy  gunfire  of  the 
American  destroyers  scattered  the  enemy  boats,  and 
five  torpedoes  were  seen.  The  second  attack  was 
launched  a  few  days  later,  against  the  other  contingent, 
on  the  European  side  of  the  rendezvous.  Not  only  did 
destroyers  hold  the  boats  at  a  safe  distance,  but  their 
speed  resulted  in  sinking  at  least  one  submarine. 
Bombs  were  dropped  firing  a  charge  of  explosive  timed 
to  go  off  at  a  certain  distance  under  water.  In  one 
instance  the  wreckage  covered  the  surface  of  the  sea 
after  a  shot  at  a  periscope.  "Protected  by  our  high 
seas  convoy  destroyers  and  by  French  war  vessels," 
said  the  Secretary  of  the  United  States  Navy,  "the 
contingent  proceeded,  and  joined  the  others  at  a 
French  port.  The  whole  nation  will  rejoice  that  so 
great  a  peril  has  passed  for  the  vanguard  of  the  men 
who  will  fight  our  battles  in  France." 

This  incident  illustrates  the  method  of  protection 
chiefly  employed  by  the  British  Navy.  When  the 
original  Expeditionary  Force  was  sent  to  France, 
the  Grand  Fleet  was  in  readiness  if  the  High  Sea 
Fleet  should  venture  to  issue  to  sea.  Cruisers,  de- 
stroyers, naval  aircraft,  and  submarines  were  on  watch 
and  guard  in  the  North  Sea  and  the  Channel,  and 
the  patrol  was  maintained,  day  and  night,  without  in- 
termission until  the  army  had  been  effectively  trans- 
ported. The  patrol  was  then  organised  upon  a  greater 
scale  as  the  transport  grew  in  volume.  The  Dover 
Patrol  undertook  a  work  of  the  highest  importance, 
and  was  instrumental  in  holding  off  all  destroyer  at- 
tacks from  the  eastward.  Cruisers,  destroyers,  armed 
motor  launches^  mine  trawlers  and  drifters,  and  other 


The  Navy  and  Army  Transport     61 

vessels  have  been  constantly  at  work,  and  observation 
balloons  and  seaplanes  have  never  ceased  their  vigil. 
The  triumph  has  been  complete,  the  enemy  subma- 
rines have  never  penetrated  the  guard,  and  the  Chan- 
nel communications  of  all  the  armies  in  France  have 
been  made  secure.  There  are  certain  features  of  this 
organisation  which  cannot  be  dealt  with  here.  The 
same  system  has  been  carried  into  the  Mediterranean 
and  elsewhere,  and  the  French,  Italian,  and  Japanese 
navies  have  shared  in  the  work. 

In  this  matter  of  transport  protection  the  British 
Navy  has  rendered  magnificent  service  to  all  the  Allies. 
General  Sir  Charles  Munro,  after  the  evacuation  of 
Gallipoli,  said  it  was  a  stroke  of  good  fortune  for 
the  Army  to  be  associated  with  a  service  "whose  work 
remained  throughout  this  anxious  period  beyond  the 
power  of  criticism  or  cavil,"  and  General  Sir  Ian  Ham- 
ilton reported  that  "one  tiny  flaw  in  the  mutual  trust 
and  confidence  animating  the  two  services  would  have 
wrecked  the  whole  enterprise."  This  is  true  not  only 
of  Gallipoli  but  of  every  place  in  which  the  Navy  has 
been  serving  as  the  guard  of  the  communications, 
and  the  base  and  support  of  the  military  forces. 

It  will  be  understood  that  the  Transport  Depart-  ^ 
ment  of  the  British  Admiralty  undertook  a  colossal 
work  at  the  beginning  of  the  war.  It  possessed  the 
unrivalled  experience  gained  during  the  South  African 
War,  1 899- 1 90 1,  when  about  275,000  men  were  dis- 
patched and  supplied  with  all  army  requirements  over 
a  distance  of  7,000  miles  of  sea  and  land.  Then  there 
was  no  enemy  afloat,  but  the  operation  was  greater 
than  any  previously  undertaken,  and  evoked  the  ad- 


62  The  Achievement  of  the  British  Navy 

miration  of  the  world  as  a  revelation  of  resource, 
energy,  organisation,  national  spirit,  good  manage- 
ment, and  business-like  capacity.  What  will  be  said 
when  the  now  incalculable  work  of  the  Transport  De- 
partment in  this  war  can  be  estimated  and  described? 
The  inspection  and  selection  of  ships  and  the  conver- 
sion of  them  for  the  accommodation  of  troops  and 
horses  was  a  great  business.  In  1899  it  was  estimated 
that  a  satisfactory  transport  should  be  capable  of 
carrying  a  number  of  men  equal  to  2  5  per  cent,  of  her 
tonnage.  What  is  the  rule  now  one  cannot  say.  There 
are  important  considerations  of  ballasting,  speed,  coal 
consumption,  and  other  matters  in  such  business,  and 
the  removal  or  adaptation  of  existing  fittings  and  the 
allotting  of  space  for  various  purposes  have  occupied 
the  Admiralty  officers  and  officials. 

It  was  a  business  both  of  embarkation  and  disem- 
barkation, on  both  sides  of  the  Channel,  and  special 
provision  was  required  for  the  wounded  and  sick. 
The  Naval  Transport  and  Embarkation  Officers  have 
had  a  very  exhausting  and  anxious  time  in  taking  up, 
fitting,  coaling,  and  otherwise  preparing  vessels  for 
sea,  and  in  giving  orders  for  the  movements  of  ships 
at  the  ports  on  arrival  and  departure,  as  well  as  in 
providing  for  the  safety  and  expedition  of  all  embarka- 
tions of  men,  horses,  and  stores,  and  arranging  for 
docking  and  like  matters.  They  merit  the  gratitude 
of  the  country  and  the  Allies.  It  may  be  said  that  in 
all  the  naval  and  commercial  ports  of  the  United  King- 
dom, and  in  the  French  ports  as  well,  work  of  this  or 
like  kind  has  been  in  progresss  uninterruptedly  since 
the  beginning  of  the  war.    It  is  strictly  naval  work, 


The  Navy  and  Army  Transport     63 

and  was  set  on  an  excellent  and  satisfactory  footing 
by  the  Admiralty;  but,  as  the  war  progressed,  and  the 
pressure  grew  greater,  imposing  additional  duties  on 
the  Transport  Department,  some  matters  dealt  with 
by  certain  of  its  branches,  and  concerned  with  ship 
construction,  modification,  and  repair,  were  placed 
in  charge  of  competent  civilians. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

The  Navy  that  Flies 

Heard  the  heavens  fill  with  shouting,  and  there  rain'd  a 

ghastly  dew 
From  the  nations'  airy  navies  grappling  in  the  central  blue. 

Tennyson. 

FROM  an  account  of  the  work  of  the  British 
Navy  in  the  war  there  must  not  be  omitted 
some  exposition  of  the  gallant  doings  of  the 
men  of  the  Royal  Naval  Air  Service.  They  have 
made  their  mark  in  the  war,  in  every  theatre  of  it, 
and  no  one  can  tell  what  part  they  will  play  before 
the  struggle  is  at  an  end.  Of  some  of  their  work 
very  little  is  known.  They  render  "silent"  service, 
like  that  of  the  Navy  to  which  they  belong.  They 
do  not  always  carry  on  their  duty  alone.  On  occa- 
sions they  participate  in  that  of  the  Royal  Flying 
Corps  of  the  Army.  They  have  been  associated  with 
the  gallant  French  airmen,  and  the  Americans  come 
with  a  new  burst  of  energy.  The  Germans  know 
British  naval  airmen  at  Zeebrugge  and  Ostend,  and 
in  all  the  country  behind  those  places;  at  sea  also, 
when  the  German  raiders  return  from  their  exploits; 
and  on  the  West  front  of  the  Army,  too,  where  they 
go  at  times  far  behind  the  line,  spying  out  the  land, 
taking  number  and  note  of  the  enemy,  dropping  bombs 
on  his  store  and  ammunition  dumps,  disturbing  all 

64 


THE  CAPTURED  GERMAN  SUBMARINE  MINE-LAYER  UCo 


The  Navy  that  Flies  65 

his  rearward  services,  and  stirring  up  his  aerodromes 
and  the  nursing  places,  where  his  fledglings,  whom 
they  call  "quirks,"  are  taking  to  themselves  wings 
and  learning  to  fly. 

The  Royal  Naval  Air  Service  has  lent  its  aid  to 
the  Italians,  has  provided  unpleasant  experiences  for 
the  Bulgarians,  has  dropped  bombs  on  the  Turks  at 
Gaza  and  thereabout,  has  rendered  good  service  in 
the  Mesopotamian  business,  and  was  invaluable  in 
"spotting"  for  the  guns  which  destroyed  the  fugitive 
German  cruiser  Konigsberg  in  the  jungle-clad  reaches 
of  the  Rufiji  River.  From  dawn  to  dusk  these 
knights  of  the  air  have  been  flying  in  many  parts  of 
the  world,  and  night-flying  is  their  particular  pleasure 
when  there  is  great  work  to  be  done.  Their  "game 
book"  is  very  full  of  astounding  episodes  of  fighting 
which,  in  exciting  experiences,  put  into  the  shade  the 
thrilling  narratives  which  for  generations  have  de- 
lighted the  hearts  of  boys.  Few  people  know  the 
sleepless  vigil  which  the  naval  airmen  keep  all  round 
the  British  coasts,  constantly  fl3nng  to  keep  watch 
upon  the  enemy,  to  spot  his  submarines,  to  discover 
his  mine-fields,  and  to  defeat  any  efforts  he  may  make 
when  transports  are  moving  at  sea.  Such  is  an  out- 
line of  the  occupations  and  duties  of  the  Royal  Naval 
Air  Service. 

There  was  an  "Air  Department"  at  the  Admiralty 
before  the  war,  and  a  Naval  Wing  of  the  Royal 
Flying  Corps  with  its  "Central  Air  Office,"  its  Flying 
School  at  Eastchurch,  and  seaplane  and  aeroplane 
stations  at  six  places  on  the  coasts,  as  well  as  airships 
at  Farnborough  and  Kingsnorth.  At  the  Royal  inspec- 


66   The  Achievement  of  the  British  Navy 

tion  at  Spithead  of  the  great  mobilised  Fleet,  just 
before  the  war,  naval  aeroplanes,  seaplanes,  and  air- 
ships gave  a  fine  display.  Development  was  rapid,  the 
Royal  Naval  Air  Service  came  into  independent  ex- 
istence, and  there  is  now  the  Fifth  Sea  Lord  at  the 
Admiralty  charged  with  the  supervision  of  the  Royal 
Naval  Air  Service,  and  representing  it  on  the  Air 
Board. 

Some  of  the  most  useful  work  of  the  Royal  Naval 
Air  Service  is  in  "spotting"  for  the  guns  of  the 
warships.  Its  officers  made  a  methodical  photo- 
graphic survey  of  the  coast  from  Nieuport  to  the 
Dutch  frontier  early  in  the  war  to  assist  the  monitors 
which  were  then  bombarding  the  coast,  and  to  observe 
and  correct  their  fire.  They  worked  from  a  height 
of  about  12,000  feet,  constantly  observing  the  devel- 
opment of  the  enemy's  gun  emplacements,  all  in  de- 
spite of  hostile  aeroplanes  and  shells.  That  survey  has 
been  continued,  and  the  result  is  the  finest  thing  in 
aerial  cartography  which  has  ever  been  achieved. 

It  will  illustrate  this  part  of  the  special  work  of 
the  seaplanes  if  we  describe  how  they  began,  which 
we  are  enabled  to  do  by  a  lively-witted  official  scribe, 
who  examined  the  records  of  their  operations,  and 
has  given  his  impressions: — 

"I  can't  see  where  they're  pitching,"  said  the 
Navy-that-Floats,  referring  to  the  shells  of  the  mon- 
itors bursting  twelve  miles  away.  "What  about 
spotting  for  us,  old  son?"  "That  will  I  do,"  replied 
the  Navy-that-Flies.  "And  more  also.  But  I  shall 
have  to  wear  khaki,  because  it's  done  out  here;  by 
everybody,  apparently." 

"Wear  anything  you  like,"  replied  the  Navy-that- 


The  Navy  that  Flies  67 

Floats,  "as  long  as  you  help  us  to  hit  those  shore- 
batteries.  Only — because  you  wear  khaki  (the 
Royal  Naval  Air  Service  does  not  usually  wear 
khaki)  and  see  life,  don't  forget  you're  still  the  same 
old  Navy,  as  it  was  in  the  beginning,  is  now,  and 
ever  shall  be." 

The  Navy-that-Flies  added  "Amen,"  and  said 
that  it  wouldn't  forget.  Wherever  its  squadrons 
were  based  they  rigged  a  flagstaff  and  flew  the 
White  Ensign  at  the  peak.  They  erected  wooden 
huts  and  painted  them  Service  grey,  labelling  them 
"Mess-deck,"  "Ward-room,"  "Gun-room,"  etc.,  as 
the  case  might  be.  They  divided  the  flights  into 
port  and  starboard  watches,  and  solemnly  asked 
leaye  to  "go  ashore"  for  recreation.  They  filled  in 
shell-holes  and  levelled  the  ground  for  aerodromes; 
they  ran  up  hangars  and  excavated  dug-outs — 
whither  they  retired  in  a  strong  silent  rush  (the 
expression  is  theirs)  when  the  apprehensive  Boche 
attempted  to  curtail  their  activity  with  bombs. 

Not  all  the  good  work  of  the  Royal  Naval  Air 
Service  in  its  co-operation  with  the  Fleet  comes  into 
public  notice.  It  rendered  excellent  service  at  the 
Dardanelles,  the  seaplane  carrier  Arc  Royal  being 
present.  There  were  many  fine  achievements,  in- 
cluding the  bombing  of  a  transport  in  the  Straits  by 
Flight-Commander  C.  H.  K.  Edmonds,  R.N.  Sea- 
planes may  take  the  place  of  scouting  cruisers,  as  the 
eyes  of  the  Fleet,  and  relieve  destroyers  of  some  of 
their  scouting  duties.  What  would  Nelson  not  have 
given  for  the  help  of  seaplanes  when  he  was  crying 
out  for  frigates,  and  was  groping  for  the  French  in 
the  Mediterranean  in  1798,  and  came  unknowingly 
within  a  short  distance  of  them;  or,  again,  when,  in 
1805,  they  eluded  him  off  Toulon?     Intelligence  of 


68  The  Achievement  of  the  British  Navy 

the  movements  of  our  enemy  is  of  the  utmost  impor- 
tance to  officers  commanding  at  sea,  and  this  is  the 
service  which  the  naval  airmen  have  been  rendering. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  war  the  Germans  enjoyed 
an  advantage  in  the  possession  of  some  dirigible 
airships,  which  sailed  in  calm  airs,  unimpeded,  over 
the  North  Sea,  surveyed  its  full  extent,  and  reported 
what  they  saw  to  the  German  naval  authorities. 
Their  number  rapidly  increased.  Thus  the  British 
Fleet  was  to  a  certain  extent  hampered  in  its  opera- 
tions. Now  the  situation  is  changed.  The  enemy's 
airships  know  the  peril  of  coming  within  range  of 
anti-aircraft  guns,  and  they  dread  the  "hornets"  which 
carry  special  means  of  setting  them  on  fire.  There 
are  British  airships,  too,  and  observation  captive  bal- 
loons, fixed  and  towed,  as  well  as  seaplanes,  main- 
tained in  adequate  numbers.  The  seaplane  played  a 
useful  part  in  the  battle  of  the  Jutland  Bank,  and 
craft  of  the  class  will  astonish  the  enemy  in  any  sub- 
sequent naval  engagement. 

The  dropping  of  bombs  by  the  seaplanes  or  aero- 
planes of  the  Royal  Naval  Air  Service  has  become 
the  most  prominent  of  its  activities.  The  machines 
are  of  great  power,  and,  acting  in  numbers,  they 
have  been  able  to  drop  an  enormous  weight  of  bombs 
on  the  enemy  positions,  particularly  in  the  districts 
behind  the  coast  of  West  Flanders.  Within  the  space 
of  four  or  five  months  70  tons  of  explosives  were 
dropped  on  the  German  aerodromes  in  Northern  Bel- 
gium. Brave  naval  airmen  in  July,  191 7,  from  a  height 
of  800  feet,  dropped  bombs  on  the  Goeben  and  other 
enemy  warships  at  the  Golden  Horn,  and  hit  the  Turk- 


The  Navy  that  Flies  69 

ish  War  Office  also.  In  this  work  the  young  officers 
— for  the  service  demands  youth — have  given  proof 
of  exceeding  keenness.  It  would  be  difficult  to  cata- 
logue the  expeditions  of  the  naval  airmen  on  the  Bel- 
gian coast.  They  have  assisted  in  most  important 
operations. 

How  far  such  work  may  be  continued,  to  what 
range  carried,  or  what  will  be  the  full  effect,  we  do 
not  know.  The  Navy-that-Flies  will  leave  nothing 
undone  that  is  capable  of  accomplishment.  It  has 
operated  in  association  with  the  work  of  French  flying 
men  on  many  occasions,  at  the  bombardment  of  Zee- 
brugge  and  elsewhere.  It  will  find  a  powerful  co- 
worker in  the  new  and  gallant  allies  who  are  bringing 
all  their  force  to  bear  from  beyond  the  Atlantic.  The 
United  States  air  service  will  develop  with  extraordi- 
nary rapidity,  and  its  co-operation  will  be  warmly  wel- 
comed by  British  naval  airmen.  So  abundant  is  the 
confidence  of  Americans,  so  strong  and  virile  their 
faith  in  themselves,  that  some  of  them  look  to  the 
aeroplane  to  end  the  war.  Rear-Admiral  Bradley  A. 
Fiske  has  demanded  an  immediate  naval  attack  on  the 
German  fleet  and  submarine  bases  in  the  Baltic  by  a 
monster  fleet  of  aeroplanes  and  seaplanes.  He  believes 
that  the  importance  of  naval  aerial  operations  is  not 
sufficiently  realised  by  the  Allies  and  that  Essen  may 
be  destroyed  by  bombardment  from  the  air. 

The  field  of  speculation  does  not  fall  within  the 
scope  of  this  little  book,  the  object  of  which  is  to 
illustrate  the  work  of  the  Fleet  and  its  associated 
services  in  all  the  theatres  of  war.  The  Royal  Naval 
Ail  Service  is  still  young,  and  has  undoubtedly  a 


70  The  Achievement  of  the  British  Navy 

great  future.  Already  it  has  proved  a  valuable  auxil- 
iary. It  has  assisted  in  the  important  business  of  pro- 
viding complete  strategical  observations.  It  has  aided 
the  work  of  the  commercial  blockade,  in  making  more 
easy  on  many  occasions  the  operations  of  the  much- 
tried  examination  service.  Undoubtedly  the  trans- 
port of  the  armies  and  their  stores  across  the  Channel 
and  in  many  seas,  which  was  the  subject  of  the  last 
chapter,  would  have  been  conducted  with  less  cer- 
tainty, and  perhaps  with  less  confidence,  if  it  had  not 
been  for  the  active  co-operation,  as  the  eyes  of  the 
Fleet,  of  the  naval  flying  men.  The  long-range  gun- 
nery of  warships  against  permanent  fortifications,  both 
at  the  Dardanelles  and  on  the  Belgian  coast,  has  gained 
in  accuracy  from  the  observation  by  the  aircraft  of 
the  Navy. 

This  subject  might  have  been  pursued  further, 
but  enough  has  been  said  to  show  that,  among  the 
agencies  employed  by  the  British  Fleet  in  the  accom- 
plishment of  the  supreme  duties  which  it  exercises  for 
the  safety  of  the  country  and  the  support  of  the  Al- 
lies, the  Royal  Naval  Air  Service  holds  an  important 
place.  It  has  evoked  enthusiasm  among  its  officers, 
who  have  maintained  in  a  high  degree,  in  many  a  bat- 
tle in  the  air,  the  fearlessness,  resource,  and  daring  of 
the  Naval  Service  to  which  they  belong. 


CHAPTER  IX 

Officers  and  Men  of  the  Navy 

Sailor,  what  of  the  debt  we  owe  you? 

Day  or  night  is  the  peril  more? 
Who  so  dull  that  he  fails  to  know  you, 

Sleepless  guard  of  our  island  shore? 
Safe  the  corn  to  the  farmyard  taken; 

Grain  ships  safe  upon  all  the  seas; 
Homes  in  peace  and  a  faith  unshaken — 

Sailor,  what  do  we  owe  for  these? 

The  late  Viscount  Stuart. 

NO  picture  of  the  war  work  of  the  British 
Navy  could  be  complete  without  some  ac- 
count of  its  officers  and  men.  From  what 
has  already  been  said,  the  nature  of  the  qualities 
demanded  of  them  will  have  been  realised.  In  the 
general  direction  of  the  Navy  by  the  Admiralty  there 
have  been  required  calm  reflection,  profound  insight, 
strategic  imagination,  sound  and  swift  judgment  as 
to  the  full  use  and  the  yet  ill-understood  limitations 
of  sea-power,  an  abundant  spring  of  action,  and  the 
unflinching  resolution  to  give  effect  to  the  utmost  to 
the  striking  and  controlling  force  of  the  naval  arm. 
In  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Grand  Fleet  there 
was  needed  the  high  ability  to  administer  and  exercise 
the  command,  to  inspire  officers  and  men  of  every  rank 
and  rating  in  the  Fleet  with  zeal,  efficiency,  and  devo- 
tion, as  well  as  sleepless  vigilance  in  the  long  waiting 

71 


72   The  Achievement  of  the  British  Navy 

for  the  enemy,  and  instant  readiness  for  action  at  all 
times.  The  Commander-in-Chief  does  not  work  alone. 
He  has  a  staff  who  collaborate  in  these  duties  and  give 
effect  to  his  plans;  and  admirals  secondary  in  com- 
mand, who  have  no  light  task  in  directing  the  work 
and  operations  of  the  larger  elements  of  the  Fleet.  Sir 
John  Jellicoe,  who  was  appointed  to  the  Grand  Fleet 
at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  was  a  master  of  the  high 
attainments  required  for  his  office,  and  it  was  he  who 
created  the  base  of  his  operations,  organised  all  the 
agencies  of  his  command,  and  exercised  that  command 
with  consummate  ability.  The  instrument  he  had 
shaped  and  handled  so  capably  fell  to  the  charge  of 
Sir  David  Beatty,  a  most  gallant  officer,  eminently 
fitted  to  use  it,  whose  temperament  is  the  very  spirit 
of  action,  and  yet  who  forms  his  plans  in  the  mould 
of  cool  reflection.  Happily  for  the  British  Navy,  the 
fire  of  action  is  mingled  in  its  officers  with  the  ice  of 
thought.  They  know  when  to  strike,  and  when  they 
strike  they  strike  hard. 

Great  responsibilities  have  rested  on  the  captains  of 
His  Majesty's  ships.  They  showed  in  the  Jutland  bat- 
tle, in  which  they  were  tried  by  the  searching  test 
of  decisive  action,  that  they  possessed  the  ability  to 
inspire  and  discipline  their  men,  and  to  put  forth  the 
maximum  of  the  fighting  power  of  the  ships.  Officers 
in  detached  command  away  from  the  Fleet  have  ren- 
dered very  great  services.  The  junior  officers  are  be- 
yond praise.  By  universal  testimony,  their  devotion, 
courage,  and  ever-ready  professional  skill,  in  every 
test  of  emergency  and  endurance,  have  never  been  ex- 
celled.   The  officers  of  the  destroyers  are  men  above 


Officers  and  Men  of  the  Navy       73 

price.  The  commanders  of  submarines,  who  have  even 
carried  their  enterprise  into  the  Baltic,  and  risked  the 
perils  of  mine  and  gun  in  the  narrow  waters  of  the 
Dardanelles  and  the  Bosphorus,  are  officers  who  have 
won  new  laurels  for  the  Fleet. 

The  men  of  the  lower  deck,  wherever  they  serve, 
give  daily  proof  of  the  bravery,  hardihood,  cheerful- 
ness, and  long  endurance  which  have  always  been 
the  qualities  of  British  seamen.  Let  Sir  John  Jellicoe 
speak  of  them  as  he  knew  them: — 

Nothing  can  ever  have  been  finer  than  the  cool- 
ness and  courage  shown  in  every  case  where  ships 
have  been  sunk  by  mines  or  torpedoes;  discipline 
has  been  perfect,  and  men  have  gone  to  their  deaths 
not  only  most  gallantly,  but  most  unselfishly.  One 
heard  on  all  sides  of  numerous  instances  of  men  giv- 
ing up  on  these  occasions  the  plank  which  had  sup- 
ported them  to  some  more  feeble  comrade,  and  I 
feel  prouder  every  day  that  passes  that  I  command 
such  men.  During  the  period  of  waiting  and  watch- 
ing they  are  cheerful  and  contented,  in  spite  of  the 
grey  dullness  of  their  lives. 

It  would  not  be  difficult  to  single  out  instances 
from  the  records  of  the  war  of  constructive  power  in 
thought,  and  sound  and  swift  judgment  in^  action,  as 
well  as  of  splendid  courage,  enterprise,  dash,  and 
resolution — call  it  what  you  will — in  the  crisis  of 
battle  and  in  moments  of  stress,  exhibited  in  a  manner 
rarely  exampled  in  naval  warfare.  The  British  Fleet 
has  been  rich  in  the  mental  endowments  of  its  officers, 
showing  them  to  possess  grasp  and  insight,  and  moral 
force,  to  dominate  hesitation  and  sustain  action  in  the 
tremendous  emergencies  of  battle  and  when  confronted 


74  The  Achievement  of  the  British  Navy 

with  the  most  formidable  responsibilities.  Excite- 
ment has  never  carried  them  away.  Judgment  has 
worked  through  all  their  endeavours  as,  in  the  long 
watches  and  waiting,  it  has  sustained  them. 

Eulogy  is  not  required.  Nothing  that  has  been 
said  exceeds  the  merits  of  officers  and  men.  It  is 
right  that  these  things  should  be  understood.  The 
man  is  more  than  the  machine,  and  the  finest  fleet 
and  most  complete  material  equipment  are  dead  and 
inert  without  the  living  power  of  the  officers  who  com- 
mand, and  the  men  who  man  the  ships  and  vessels  of 
every  class.  It  is  they  who  have  done  and  are  doing 
the  work  of  the  Navy  in  the  war.  They,  and  not  their 
ships,  have  given  security  to  the  British  Isles,  have 
kept  the  seas  and  oceans  open  for  the  Allies,  have  safe- 
guarded every  interest  afloat,  and  have  worked  and 
are  working,  day  and  night,  to  defeat  the  purposes  of 
the  enemy. 

We  now  turn  to  a  consideration  which  is  of  para- 
mount importance  for  a  right  understanding  of  the 
Navy's  work  in  the  war.  England  is  the  support 
of  all  her  Continental  Allies.  If  she  should  suffer  or 
lose  her  power  of  supplying  them  with  armies  and 
arms,  or  should  weaken  in  her  offensive,  the  Allies 
would  collapse.  This  is  a  fact  of  primary  impor- 
tance. The  Germans  realise  it  fully.  They  hesitate 
at  nothing  in  their  efforts  to  strike  at  England.  They 
publicly  declared  that  they  would  reduce  her  by  fam- 
ine. They  struck  at  her  mercantile  marine,  not  merely 
at  ships  which  were  armed  and  engaged  in  the  naval 
service  in  such  large  numbers,  but  at  the  ordinary 
cargo  vessels,  including  neutral  vessels  carrying  Brit- 


Officers  and  Men  of  the  Navy       75 

ish  supplies,  and  at  fishermen  pursuing  their  regular 
avocations,  who,  under  The  Hague  Conventions,  vsrere, 
with  their  boats,  tackle,  rigging,  gear,  and  cargoes,  to 
be  exempt  from  capture,  and  still  more  from  destruc- 
tion. Of  the  officers  and  men  of  these  services  we 
must  speak  also.  It  became  necessary,  in  the  condi- 
tions which  had  arisen,  to  bring  the  whole  mercantile 
marine  under  naval  direction  and  orders,  and  practi- 
cally it  is  embodied  with  the  Navy,  and  provided  for 
the  most  part  with  armaments  for  defence,  and  closely 
in  touch  with  a  great  protective  organisation. 

When  Mr.  Balfour  was  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty, 
speaking  in  the  House  of  Commons  on  March  7th, 
19 1 6,  he  directed  special  attention  to  this  aspect  of 
naval  work,  not  merely  to  the  service  of  ships  flying 
the  White  Ensign,  but  to  that  of  transports  and  of 
merchant  and  cargo  vessels,  and  their  officers  and 
men,  conveying  imports  and  exports,  and  the  supplies 
required  by  the  Allied  armies.  "On  them,"  he  said, 
"we  depend,  not  less  than  on  our  armed  forces,  for 
maintaining  the  necessary  economic  basis  upon  which 
all  war  must  ultimately  be  waged."  There  were,  as 
he  said,  thousands  of  officers  and  men  whose  ships  had 
been  sunk  under  them  by  mine  and  submarine,  and  yet 
who  had  cheerfully  signed  on  again,  and  were  not  to 
be  driven  from  their  ancient  heritage  of  the  sea. 
England  depends  upon  her  mercantile  marine  for  her 
national  existence.  To  a  great  extent,  her  food  and 
raw  materials  are  in  its  charge;  and  it  also  brings 
without  ceasing  hundreds  of  thousands  of  tons  of  mu- 
nitions of  many  kinds  required  by  the  Allies.  When, 
therefore,  we  estimate  the  work  of  the  Navy  in  the 


76  The  Achievement  of  the  British  Navy 

war,  we  must  give  to  the  merchant  branch  of  the  Sea 
Service  the  position  it  deserves,  as  an  absolute  and 
primary  necessity  to  England  and  her  Allies. 

The  nobility  of  the  work  carried  on  by  the  officers 
and  men  of  the  merchant  service  and  the  fishermen, 
whether  in  armed  ships,  mine  trawlers,  or  cargo  ves- 
sels, is  a  dominant  note  of  the  war.  Their  heroism 
has  been  conspicuous,  and,  as  was  stated  by  Admiral 
Sir  Henry  Jackson,  when  he  was  First  Sea  Lord  of 
the  Admiralty,  the  facility  with  which  they  learned 
to  carry  out  their  duties  as  part  of  a  trained  fighting 
force  was  extraordinary.  "The  Allied  nations,"  he 
said,  "owe  them  a  deep  debt  of  gratitude  for  their 
response,  as  well  as  for  their  indomitable  pluck  and 
endurance."  "There  is  no  room  in  the  Navy  for  any- 
thing but  the  most  sincere  admiration  and  respect  for 
the  officers  and  men  of  the  mercantile  marine,"  said 
Sir  John  Jellicoe.  They  had  practically  become  a 
part  of  the  fighting  force,  sharing  in  the  work  of  the 
Navy  in  the  war,  and  their  courageous  conduct  and 
unflinching  devotion  to  duty  have  gained  the  testimony 
of  naval  officers  everywhere,  not  only  in  the  British 
service,  but  in  the  Allied  navies  which  have  come 
into  contact  with  them.  Of  the  magnificent  service 
of  the  mine-trawlers  we  have  spoken  in  a  previous 
chapter. 

Let  this  chapter  conclude  with  an  appeal  to  Eng- 
land and  her  Allies  to  remember  the  great  and  endur- 
ing services  of  British  seamen.  They  do  not  often 
speak  of  one  another.  Sometimes,  as  by  a  flash,  as 
when  Sir  John  Jellicoe  wrote  of  his  men,  the  truth  is 
revealed.     It  was  that  taciturn  old  officer.  Sir  John 


Officers  and  Men  of  the  Navy       77 

Jervis,  who  said  of  Troubridge  that  he  had  "honour 
and  courage  as  bright  as  his  sword."  The  torch  is 
handed  on  from  one  officer  to  another.  There  are 
many  qualities  among  them.  The  fire  of  Drake  meets 
the  resolute  gravity  of  Blake;  the  long  reflection  of 
Kempenfelt  is  the  foil  to  the  fierce  glow  of  Nelson. 
The  tradition  is  continuous.  Sir  John  Jellicoe  could 
find  no  words  to  do  justice  to  his  officers  and  men 
in  the  day  and  night  actions  of  the  Jutland  Battle. 
The  glorious  traditions  of  the  past  were  worthily 
upheld.  Sir  David  Beatty  showed  his  fine  qualities  of 
gallant  leadership,  high  determination,  and  correct 
strategic  insight.  Great  qualities  were  manifested  by 
every  rank  and  rating.  Down  in  the  engine-rooms, 
seeing  nothing  of  the  battle,  men  were  working  like 
Titans,  and  some  ships  reached  speeds  which  they  had 
never  before  attained.  This  was  great  service  for 
England  and  her  Allies. 

There  is  sometimes  a  tendency  to  forget — to  lose 
proportion,  also — in  censuring  seamen  for  not  doing 
what  the  power  of  the  sea  alone  can  never  achieve. 
Howe  was  burned  in  effigy  in  London  almost  at  the 
very  time  when  he  was  fighting  his  glorious  battle 
of  Quiberon  Bay,  braving  the  perils  of  rocks  which 
were  charted  and  known,  and  not,  be  it  noted,  of 
submarines  and  mines  which  are  invisible  and  un- 
known.   As  the  sarcastic  songster  wrote  at  the  time: 

When  Hawke  did  bang 

Monsieur  Conflans, 
You  sent  us  beef  and  beer; 

Now  Monsieur's  beat. 

We've  naught  to  eat. 
Since  you  have  naught  to  fear. 


78  The  Achievement  of  the  British  Navy 

And  so  Nelson  spoke.  "I  will  only  apply,"  he  said, 
"some  very  old  lines  wrote  at  the  end  of  some  former 
war: 

"Our  God  and  sailor  we  adore 
In  times  of  danger — not  before! 
The  danger  past,  both  are  alike  requited: 
God  is  forgotten,  and  the  sailor  slighted!" 

Now,  the  object  of  this  book  is  to  show  what  are 
the  services  of  the  British  Navy  to  England  and  to 
the  Allies.  Its  influence  has  been  visible  throughout 
the  world,  working  everywhere  with  unexampled  suc- 
cess. It  operates  solely  because  of  the  qualities  and 
sacrifices  of  its  officers  and  men.  To  them  a  high 
tribute  must  be  paid. 


CHAPTER  X 

What  the  British  Navy  Is  and  What  It  Fights 
For 

Where  shall  the  watchful   sun, 

England,  my  England, 
Match  the  master-work  you've  done, 

England,  my  own? 
When  shall  he  rejoice  agen 
Such  a  breed  of  mighty  men 
As  come  forward,  one  to  ten, 
To  the  song  on  your  bugles  blown, 

England — 
Down  the  years  on  your  bugles  blown? 

JV.  E.  Henley. 

ANTAGONISM  between  England  and  Germany 
became  the  central  fact  in  the  international 
situation  many  years  before  the  war.  There 
seemed  to  be  a  fundamental  antithesis  between  the 
ideals  of  the  two  peoples.  The  freedom  of  the  English- 
man, guaranteed  to  him  by  sea-power,  appeared  ef- 
feminate and  undisciplined  weakness  to  the  German; 
-  the  freedom  of  the  German,  guaranteed  to  him  only  by 
the  military  strength  of  his  autocratic  State,  was 
regarded  as  feudal  dependence  by  the  Englishman. 
Not  to  bring  about  a  conflict,  but  to  avert  one — or, 
if  the  worst  came  to  the  worst,  to  engage  in  one  with 
success — was  the  motive  of  British  policy.  There 
was  no  visible  ground  for  German  aggression,  but 
deep-seated  antagonism  was  the  element  of  danger 

79 


80  The  Achievement  of  the  British  Navy 

which  successive  Premiers  and  Foreign  Ministers  had 
had  to  take  account  of  in  appraising  their  country's 
future,  and,  with  the  guidance  of  their  colleague  at 
the  Admiralty,  who  based  his  judgment  on  that  of 
his  naval  advisers,  they  had  obtained  the  means  to 
build  up  the  Fleet,  which  was  to  be  the  country's 
and  Empire's  defence. 

Armageddon  was  foreseen,  though  there  was  hope 
against  hope  that,  in  the  great  crisis,  the  dire  struggle 
might  be  averted.  It  was  known  that  Belgium  and 
France  would  have  need  of  England  if  the  dogs  of 
war  were  let  slip.  Many  soldiers  and  writers  had 
pointed  out  that  Belgium  would  become  the  inevitable 
pathway  of  aggression.  German  writers  had  declared 
it  an  injury  that  the  Congress  of  Vienna  had  not  es- 
tablished Germany  on  the  North  Sea,  and  Arndt  had 
expressed  the  ardent  desire  of  the  German  heart  to  re- 
conquer the  great  western  rivers,  implying  the  domi- 
nation of  the  seas.  There  were  dangers  in  these  lesser 
countries.  They  were  full  of  possibilities.  Qui  trop 
embrasse  mal  etreint.  Belgium  would  cry  aloud  for 
English  help.  As  to  Italy,  it  was  difficult  to  believe 
that  she  could  hold  to  her  compact  with  the  Central 
Powers.  Russia,  it  was  known,  would  be  against 
them.  Thus  in  all  her  naval  efforts,  long  before  the 
war,  England,  while  guarding  her  own  interests,  was 
working  and  building  up  her  naval  strength,  in  con- 
scious knowledge  of  the  duty  she  might  one  day  have 
to  her  friends  who  have  now  become  her  Allies.  This 
is  a  very  important  point,  and  it  leads  to  a  brief 
survey  of  great  sacrifices  and  unstinted  efforts  which 
Englishmen  have  made  in  the  past. 


I '  ji 


is'  •<' 


:^r 


i?l5 


What  the  British  Navy  Fights  For    81 

The  Fleet  that  went  into  the  war  was  the  most 
powerful,  best  organised,  and  best  equipped  in  every 
essential  particular  in  the  world.  Yet,  for  a  very- 
long  anterior  period.  Englishmen  had  remained  un- 
conscious of  what  they  owed  to  the  Fleet.  They  had 
fought  brilliant  campaigns  in  China,  Afghanistan,  In- 
dia, Burma,  the  Crimea,  Abyssinia,  and  elsewhere,  in 
which  the  Navy  was  a  most  essential  factor,  though 
it  had  scarcely  appeared  in  the  public  eye.  It  was 
therefore  from  a  low  ebb  that  the  British  Navy  rose  to 
the  high-water  m^k  of  the  war.  It  was  not  until  about 
the  year  1882  that  the  tide  began  to  turn,  driven  for- 
ward by  the  lively  breeze  of  a  very  useful  agitation, 
in  which  the  late  Mr.  W.  T.  Stead  took  a  prominent 
part,  and  which  is  believed  to  have  been  inspired  by 
the  present  Lord  Fisher  and  the  late  Mr.  Arnold  Fors- 
ter.  A  great  shipbuilding  scheme  was  put  in  hand  in 
1889.  Ever  since  that  time,  under  far-seeing  First 
Lords  and  First  Sea  Lords  of  the  Admiralty,  the  task 
of  asserting  British  naval  supremacy  has  gone  for- 
ward. Expenditure  on  the  Navy  mounted  from  i3i,- 
000,000  in  1901  to  £51,500,000  in  1914,  which  latter 
was  thought  a  monstrous  figure;  but  it  was  not  a 
penny  too  much  for  the  great  interests  which  had  to 
be  safeguarded. 

Battleships  of  increasing  power,  cruisers  of  many 
classes,  destroyers,  submarines,  and  auxiliaries  were 
built.  Lord  Fisher  came  to  the  Admiralty  as  First  Sea 
Lord  in  1904,  and  during  the  subsequent  six  years  an 
enormous  work  was  carried  on.  The  battleships  cul- 
minated in  the  Dreadnoughts — that  class  of  ships 
with  a  main  armament  of  all  big  guns — the  cruisers 


82  The  Achievement  of  the  British  Navy 

in  the  battle-cruisers,  destroyers  grew  more  numerous 
and  of  much  greater  power,  submarines  were  devel- 
oped in  range  and  sea-keeping  qualities.  None  of 
these  types  have  stood  still.  The  Dreadnought  de- 
veloped into  the  Super-Dreadnought,  and  the  latter 
has  developed  into  the  ships  of  powers  before  un- 
dreamed of,  which  no  one  has  yet  described.  The  sub- 
marine has  been  changed  out  of  recognition,  and  no 
one  suspects  what  these  British  vessels  can  and  will 
do  when  "The  Day"  really  comes. 

All  these  mechanical  developments  of  the  Fleet, 
which  are  so  essential  at  the  present  time,  grew  out 
of  the  impetus  given  in  and  after  the  year  1904. 
But  that  was  not  the  only  thing  which  placed  the 
country  in  such  a  position  of  advantage  at  the  begin- 
ning of  the  war.  The  battle-fleet  and  cruiser  squad- 
rons had  been  reorganised  to  coincide  with  the  needs 
of  the  Empire,  owing  to  the  shifting  of  the  stress  of 
naval  power  from  the  Atlantic  and  the  Channel  to  the 
North  Sea.  Some  squadrons  in  distant  waters  were 
reduced  in  strength  to  correspond  with  the  require- 
ments, and  non-fighting  ships — vessels  too  weak  to 
fight  and  too  slow  to  run  away — were  brought  home 
from  distant  seas,  and  their  officers  and  men  were 
made  available  for  modern  ships.  A  system  of  nu- 
cleus crews  was  adopted  for  the  reserve  ships  to  facili- 
tate mobilisation  and  to  make  sure  that  the  ships 
would  be  really  fit  for  sea.  Before  that  time  the  whole 
Fleet  had  been  pivoted  on  the  Mediterranean,  and  a 
British  warship  was  rarely  seen  in  the  North  Sea.  By 
progressive  steps  the  naval  front  was  changed  from 
the  South  to  the  East.     On  the  east  coast  of  the 


What  the  British  Navy  Fights  For   83 

United  Kingdom  destroyer  and  submarine  flotillas 
were  based  on  ports  prepared  for  them.  A  great  dock- 
yard was  erected  at  Rosyth,  and  all  along  the  coast 
naval  bases  were  developed,  and  every  preparation 
was  made  for  the  possibility  of  war.  These  were 
developments  of  great  significance,  and  the  immense 
and  growing  strength  of  the  British  Fleet  justified 
the  French  in  concentrating  their  battle  squadrons  in 
the  Mediterranean,  and  leaving  at  Brest  and  in  the 
Channel  only  a  division  of  cruisers,  supported  by  flo- 
tillas. 

Fleets  of  warships  are  meant  to  fight  when  the 
need  for  fighting  comes;  but  there  was  no  affront  to 
Germany,  no  cause  for  resentment  or  agitation,  in  the 
concentration  of  the  main  strength  of  the  British 
Fleet  in  such  places,  and  with  such  bases,  that  they 
could  carry  their  power  into  the  North  Sea.  Force 
attracts  force  in  strategy  as  in  physics,  and  the  growth 
of  the  German  High  Sea  Fleet  at  Wilhelmshaven, 
with  the  great  sea  canal  thence  to  Kiel  on  the  Baltic, 
inevitably  brought  about  the  British  concentration. 
How  magnificently  advantageous  was  the  position  se- 
cured has  already  been  shown.  In  an  earlier  chapter 
it  has  also  been  explained  that  by  the  strategic  posi- 
tion occupied  by  the  Grand  Fleet,  and  the  grip  held 
on  the  entrance  to  the  Channel  at  Dover,  the  North 
Sea  became  strategically  a  closed  sea — a  mare  clausum. 

This  fact,  which  is  a  fact  of  geography  as  well  as 
of  strategic  concentration,  has  made  the  enemy  restive 
and  resentful.  We  are  described  as  the  "tyrants  of 
the  seas,"  and  the  "freedom  of  the  seas"  became  a 
catchword  of  the  Germans.    Every  ruler  who  has  felt 


84  The  Achievement  of  the  British  Navy 

the  hard  pressure  of  British  sea-power,  whether  his 
name  was  Louis,  or  Napoleon,  or  Wilhelm,  has,  per- 
haps inevitably,  taken  this  line  in  denouncing  us  to 
neutrals  and  endeavouring  to  array  neutrals  against  us. 
In  an  earlier  stage  of  the  present  war  this  was  the 
consistent  plea  of  German  statesmen.  But  when  they 
instructed  their  sea  officers  to  sink  the  Lusitania  and 
many  other  ships,  and  when  they  threatened  with  dis- 
aster neutral  ships  which  approached  the  British  Isles, 
they  became  themselves  the  tyrants  of  the  sea  in  a  very 
real  sense,  and  they  thus  arrayed  the  United  States 
and  other  States  against  themselves,  and  brought  a  new 
Armada  to  strengthen  the  already  superior  British 
Fleet. 

The  war  is  a  fight  for  freedom.  The  British  Navy 
is  fighting,  and  glad  to  have  the  Allied  navies  fighting 
in  co-ordination  with  it,  for  the  liberation  of  oppressed 
nations  and  countries  from  military  domination. 
Command  of  the  sea  implies  no  restriction  of  naviga- 
tion. It  exists  only  in  war  time.  In  time  of  peace 
the  British  Navy  guaranteed  the  freedom  of  the  seas, 
and  will  guarantee  it  again  when  the  war  is  at  an  end. 
We  cannot  do  better  than  quote  on  this  question  what 
that  distinguished  American  writer  Admiral  Mahan 
said: — 

Why  do  English  innate  political  conceptions  of 
popular  representative  Government,  of  the  balance 
of  law  and  liberty,  prevail  in  North  America  from 
the  Arctic  Circle  to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  from  the 
Atlantic  to  the  Pacific?  Because  the  command  of 
the  sea  at  the  decisive  era  belonged  to  Great  Britain. 
In  India  and  Egypt  administrative  efficiency  has 
taken  the  place  of  a  welter  of  tyranny,  feudal  strug- 


What  the  British  Navy  Fights  For    85 

gle,  and  bloodshed,  achieving  thereby  the  compara- 
tive welfare  of  the  once  harried  populations.  What 
underlies  this  administrative  efficiency?  The  Brit- 
ish Navy,  assuring  in  the  first  place  British  control 
and  thereafter  communication  with  the  home  coun- 
try, whence  comes  the  local  power  without  which 
administration  everywhere  is  futile.  What,  at  the 
moment  when  the  Monroe  doctrine  was  proclaimed, 
insured  beyond  peradventure  the  immunity  from 
foreign  oppression  of  the  Spanish-American  colonies 
in  their  struggle  for  independence?  The  command 
of  the  sea  by  Great  Britain,  backed  by  the  feeble 
Navy  but  imposing  strategic  position  of  the  United 
States,  with  her  swarm  of  potential  commerce-de- 
stroyers, which,  a  decade  before,  had  harassed  the 
trade  even  of  the  Mistress  of  the  Seas. 

In  concluding,  therefore,  we  see  how  the  British 
Navy,  having  served  Great  Britain  and  the  British 
Empire  so  efficiently  and  so  well  in  every  interest 
and  possession,  fighting  constantly  against  every 
stealthy  device  of  the  enemy,  has  served  the  Allies 
not  less  well  and  worthily.  And  we  discover,  too, 
that  the  Navy  is  ever  friendly  to  neutral  Powers, 
and  that  the  command  of  the  sea  which  it  exercises 
in  the  war  is  the  panoply  of  freedom  and  liberty 
throughout  the  world. 


1 


if 

'I 


I.    THE  (  EXTUE  OF  SEA  TOWER:    THE  NORTH  SEA 


I  ARO  C  C  O 


T        RIP         Q.       I,        J 

II.    THE  GRASP  OF  THE  MEDITEERANEAN— LAND  AND  SEA  POWER 


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